RECENT CASES
THE PIRACTICE OF LAW
INTRODUCTION

The cases discussed in this Symposium present themselves as recent
developments in an area of continuing concern-the place of the lawyer in
his profession and the place of that profession in American society. By
exploring specific problems that have arisen in this area, the Editors believe
that it is possible to focus upon many of the forces which are stimulating
a need for change in the practice of law and then to analyze the response
of the profession to this need.
Among the factors which have stimulated change in the profession is
the rapid growth in recent years of the size of communities and of labor
groups.' Thus, the lawyer reference service and the union lawyer referral
plan, which were the subjects of dispute in Jacksonville Bar Ass'n v.
Wilson 2 and In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,3 are attempts to
bring the attorney and client together in a society where many of those
in need of legal services do not have a personal lawyer. 4
The response of the bar to the needs of a society undergoing widespread
change must be evaluated in light of several considerations. Of primary
interest to the bar is the maintenance of public confidence in the profession
and the continuation of service in the public interest. Therefore, it is felt
that the canons of ethics which embody the accepted mores of the profession
must be strictly applied and that any innovation in the profession must be
in keeping with these canons.; Further, the inherent conservatism of the
bar must be considered in this regard. Although they fill an important
function as social inventors, 6 dealing as they do with a system of law based
upon precedent, lawyers at times have been inclined to be critical of change.7
Perhaps this is because of the awareness that abrupt, ill-considered changes
often create uncertainty or unrest, or the fact that as an inherently middle
class group the bar has a distrust of speculative thought." In any event,
this conservatism has perhaps acted as a brake upon the ready acceptance
(1955).
2. 102 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1958). See pp. 388-92 infra.
3. 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E2d 163 (1958). See pp. 392-98 infra.
1. See TWEED, THE CHANGING 'PRAcriCE OF LAW 10

4. HURST, GROWTH OF AmEUCAN LAW 325-26 (1950).

5. See cases cited notes 2, 3 sora.
6. HURST, op. cit. supra note 4, at 335-38. The inventions of the lawyer include
the corporation, the railroad equipment trust certificate, and the reorganization of
corporate financial structures.
7. Id. at 358-59; TWEED, op. cit. supra note 1, at 11-12.
8. HURST, op. cit. supra note 4, at 305-06; see also the discussion in id. at 254.
(387)
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of substantial changes in the practice of law. The Railroad Brotherhood
case and State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., appear to
present examples of the operation of this attitude. Another consideration
which may well have conditioned the response of the bar to the problems
raised in the Connecticut Trust Co., Jacksonville Bar Ass'n, Railroad
Brotherhood, and Ginsburg v. Kovrak 10 cases is that the practice of law
is a business as well as a profession. To a large extent, the gauge of the
profession's usefulness as a social tool is the extent to which the bar has
been successful in maintaining the professional ideal of public service in a
society which stresses competition, individualism and material gain. The
bar as a business puts a constant strain on the professional ideal. The way
in which the bar applies the broad prohibitions of the canons of ethics to
discipline members whom it deems to have sacrificed that ideal is the
tangible manifestation of the attempt to achieve a satisfactory working relationship between the ideal and material gain. It would also be unrealistic
to say that business considerations do not enter into the applications of the
canons. Lawyers as businessmen must be concerned with competition
from other lawyers, with diminution of the collective income of the profession, with methods for regulating competition for legal business, and at the
same time retain the confidence of the public as a profession dedicated
primarily to service rather than profit. Further, the proscriptions of the
Constitution are not always consistent with the approach which many
lawyers might consider to be most efficacious. Kovrak, Matter of Dreier,"
and In re Sawyer 12 are particularly relevant in studying the conflicts which
are occasioned in this regard.
These various considerations exert important influences on the outcome of the following cases. The subtleties of these often unspoken policies
make it difficult to evaluate precisely the influence of any given professional
or business factor on the result of a particular case. The reader is invited
to weigh in his own mind the influences of these factors on each of the
cases.

ADVERTISEMENT IN NEWSPAPER BY LAWYER REFERENCE SERVICE NOT
VIOLATIVE OF CANON 27 PROHIBITING SOLICITATION OF PROFESSIONAL
EMPLOYMENT BY ADVERTISING
Plaintiff, an attorney, sued for himself and as representative of other
attorneys for a decree declaring that the operation and advertisement of the
Lawyer Reference Service of the Jacksonville Bar Association was in viola9. 140 A.2d 863 (Conn. 1958). See pp. 398-402 infra.
10. 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 79 Sup. Ct. 95 (1958). See
pp. 404-09 infra.
11. 258 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1958). See pp. 409-14 infra.
12. No. 15,109, 9th Cir., June 9, 1958, cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 553 (1958).
See pp. 415-19 inira.
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tion of Canon 27 of the American Bar Association.' The advertising in
question appeared in a local newspaper as follows: "Lawyer Reference
Service. If you do not have a lawyer, contact this official agency of the
Jacksonville Bar Association for referral to a lawyer to handle your legal
matters for a reasonable fee." 2 The trial court held that this advertisement was an unethical solicitation of legal business, but the Supreme Court
of Florida reversed on the ground that the purpose of Canon 27 was to
prevent competition in advertising, and advertising by a lawyer reference
service was "the very antithesis of competition." 3 Jacksonville Bar Ass'n
v. Wilson, 102 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1958).
A lawyer reference service 4 is a "plan whereby persons of moderate
means desirous of legal service, and not knowing how to get it, may go to
a central office, present their problems briefly and, if the need exists, then
be referred to participating lawyers specializing in the field in which their
problems are concerned." 5 Normally, as in the service in question, pny
member of the bar in good repute and in active practice may join the plan."
Referral to the various participating attorneys is on a rotating basis."
The prohibitions against advertisement and solicitation in the legal
profession are of ancient origin, having begun at a time when lawyers did
not depend upon the profession for their livelihood. 8 As exemplified by
Canon 27, the prohibition against advertising has persisted to the present
day. Lawyers may make themselves known to the public by having their
names published in an approved law list," by a listing in a classified telephone directory 10 if set in nondistinctive type,'1 and through the customary
use of simple professional cards. 12 However, no attorney may advertise a
1. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 27, at 19 (1957) (hereinafter
cited as A.BA CANONS) : "It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by
circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations." The plaintiff also claimed the Service
violated ABA CANONS No. 28. This argument was summarily handled by the court.
2. Instant case at 294. A similar advertisement was placed in the Jacksonville
telephone directory. Ibid.
3.Instant case at 295.
4. On May 1, 1956, these services were in operation in ninety-seven cities. Brief
for the ABA as Amicus Curiae, p. 6. A recent report of the Committee on Lawyer
Referral Service indicates that the number of services has since grown rapidly so
that by 1958 there were 168 plans in operation, handling about 150,000 cases a year.
44 A.B.A.J. 1064 (1958).
5. Martin & Cook, Lawyers Reference Service, Mich. S.B.J., April 1949, p. 5.
The so-called specialties of lawyers are listed by the participating lawyer himself and,
as a practical matter, are unverified. PORTEa, LAWYER REFERENCE PLANS 8 (1949).
6. Martin & Cook, supra note 5, at 6.
7. Id. at 8.
8. Note, Advertising, Solicitatio and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. Ray. 677, 678

(1954).

9. ABA CANONS No. 27.
10. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
(1957).
11. Id. No. 284, at 601.
12. ABA CANONS No. 27.

ON PROFESSIONAL

ETiiIcS No. 53, at 142
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specialty in the law,13 or even a collateral business in which he is engaged,
14
if it could have any close connection with the attorney's law practice.
Even the lawyer's shingle must share his modesty, being not such as would
attract "the attention of persons looking for a lawyer, although not for
him." 15 It is said that lawyers should not be permitted to advertise because
the merchant's techniques of publicity are incompatible with the status of
the law as a profession and because the resulting competition in publicity
among lawyers would be undesirable. 6 However, increased competition
for the lawyer's business from title companies, real estate men, banks,
accountants, tax counsellors and other experts in areas related to the law,
who are not burdened by restrictions on publicity, 17 has produced some
relaxation of Canon 27.18 Thus, in 1938, the committee on legal ethics
of the American Bar Association held that organized bar associations were
19
permitted to advertise on behalf of the legal profession as a whole, and,
20
in 1940, lawyer reference services were permitted to advertise.
The instant court reasoned that competition among lawyers was the
evil against which Canon 27 was directed, and, since all members of the
bar can join the reference service, competition was not present in the instant
case. Therefore, it found Canon 27 inapplicable. 21 It is true that, if all
attorneys in a given area were to participate in the service, competition
would not result. This fact, however, does not warrant the conclusion that
competition is not present between those lawyers participating and those
who do not choose to join.2 Both groups offer the same services and both
hold these services out to much the same segment of the public. The potential clientele of the lawyer reference service is said to be persons in the
$3,000 to $20,000 income range.P In this income group are to be found
24
most of the potential nonbusiness clients of the nonparticipating attorney.
Moreover, since fees from referred cases are set by the various sponsoring
bar associations and vary from three to five dollars per half-hour or hour
13. It re Steinberg, 44 Wash. 2d 707, 269 P.2d 970 (1954). For a discussion of
the specialty problem see pp. 404-09 ifra.
14. In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 97 A.2d 621 (1953).
15. DRaINxR, LEGAL ETHics 231 (1953).
16. Id. at 211-12; instant case at 295.
17. See, e.g., TWzE, THE CHANGING PRACTiCE OF LAW 11 (1955).
18. DRINKER, op. cit. mwprca note 15, at 254-59.
19. But such advertising program "must in fact be motivated by a desire to benefit
the lay public and carried out in such a way as to avoid the impression that it is
actuated by a selfish desire to increase professional employment." ABA, OPINIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 179, at 355, 358 (1957).
20. Id. No. 205, at 416. The instant case essentially ratifies that opinion.
21. Instant case at 295.
22. Only eighty-eight of Jacksonville's 500 lawyers belonged to the service. Brief
for Appellant, p. 11.
23. Voorhees, The Outlook for Lawyer Referral Service: Much Remainl To Be

Done, 38 A.B.A.J. 193, 194 (1952).

24. About 80% of all urban dwellers are said to fall within the $3,000 to $20,000
income group. Ibid.
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during the first visit to the attorney,25 it would appear that office and
clerical expenses would make participation in the plan economically unfeasible for many attorneys. This situation, at least potentially, is not one
best described as the "antithesis of competition." 2 6
However, the recognition that competition exists between the participators and the nonparticipators in the plan does not necessarily compel
the conclusion that the reference services should be prohibited from advertising. If an effective reference service is desired, the level of advertising
permitted the services should not be lowered to a position of equality with
nonparticipating attorneys since the person in need of legal assistance, but
without knowledge of how to get it, would in all probability not know of
the service unless informed by advertisements. While some advertising
is necessary, the danger of prospective competition between the service and
the nonparticipating attorneys necessitates a closer control over the level
of advertising used by the services than the instant court seemed willing to
apply. Potential legal clients fall into two groups, those who know lawyers
at least by reputation or have the means through friends or advisers to
locate one, and those who, from ignorance or mistrust, do not consult an
attorney when a legal problem arises.2 7 Any advertising which induces a
client of the first category to utilize the lawyer reference plan would merely
achieve the substitution of the reference service for the nonparticipating
attorney to whom such client would ultimately have resorted. However,
any advertising which induces clients of the second category to utilize the
plan would accomplish the socially desirable ends of the service without
competing to any appreciable extent with nonparticipating attorneys. This
selective advertising could be accomplished by a twofold publicity campaign
by the local bar associations which stresses, first, that it is important to
consult an attorney before trouble arises and, second, that if a suitable
attorney cannot be located, the lawyer reference service should be consulted.
The lawyer reference service should be presented merely as a less desirable
alternative to be used when the normal lawyer selection process is not
available. In this connection, it would seem most undesirable to extol the
abilities and characters of the reference service lawyers, as has been proposed by one advocate of the plan.2 8 Phrases allowed by the instant court
25. Martin & Cook, supra note 5, at 7.
26. It has been said that "with adequate publicity, the eventual possibilities of the
service seem almost unlimited." Voorhees, The Lawyers Reference Plan, 19 PA.
B.A.Q. 304, 310 (1948). If this competition has not yet reached serious proportions
it is because the adequate publicity advocated by the proponents of the service has
not yet come to pass. Voorhees, The Outlook for Lawyer Referral Service: Much
Remains To Be Done, 38 A.B.AJ. 193, 195 (1952). In 1957, for example, the Lawyer
Referral Service of Philadelphia made only 1,192 referrals, a negligible proportion
of the business transacted by the city's 3,000 lawyers. In Jacksonville, the 88 participating lawyers garnered some 1,200 prospective clients in a three-year period,
perhaps as a direct result of advertisement which if attempted by a private lawyer
would lead to disbarment. Brief for Appellant, p. 12.
27. Voorhees, The Outlook for Lawyer Referral Service: Much Remains To Be
Done, 38 A.B.A.J. 193, 194 (1952).
28. PORTER, LAWYER REFERENCE PLANS 12 (1949).
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such as "reasonable rates" 2 and "official agency of the bar association"
should generally not be permitted. Such phrases may imply to the public
that the members of the lawyer reference service are superior to the nonparticipating bar. Persons should be encouraged to locate an attorney as
a result of their own investigation, and, in the interests of fairness and
candor, no inference should be made that the rotating list of the reference
service is as desirable as that practice.

RAILROAD BROTHERHOOD LEGAL Am PLAN HELD To VIOLATE STATUTORY
PROSCRIPTION OF LAWYER-FINANCED SOLICITATION

The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen instituted a plan for providing
legal aid to members injured in railroad accidents.' This plan provided
that a brotherhood-appointed investigator, upon notification by the "legal
aid" department, would investigate an accident soon after it occurred, obtain
all the facts, and then urge the injured member or his family to sign a
contract, which the investigator usually carried with him, retaining one of
sixteen independent regional counsel. The brotherhood had selected these
counsel on the basis of their ability, in their particular locale, to secure high
jury verdicts.2 To be selected as regional counsel, the lawyer had to agree
to pay all costs of litigation, regardless of outcome, and to accept a twentyfive per cent contingent fee. The lawyer also paid the brotherhood investigator for the time spent in the investigation on an hourly basis and
often added a gratuity.3 The sixteen regional counsel collectively paid the
operating expenses of the "legal aid" department. 4
These activities
prompted the bar association to initiate disciplinary proceedings against
four attorneys participating in the plan. The brotherhood petitioned the
29. Advertisement of the moderate cost aspect has met considerable criticism in
reference plan cities. Id. at 14.
1. Compensation for such injuries is governed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
2. The suits were not necessarily brought in the locale where the accident took
place, but rather in the jurisdiction where juries were known to be more lenient and
counsel had had success in obtaining large judgments. Brief for the Illinois State
Bar Association, p. 21. Thus, a trainman, injured in Pennsylvania, might sign a
contract with a Chicago lawyer to bring the suit there. Testimony of Edward B.
Henslee, Jr., Appendices to Brief of ABA as Amicus Curiae, p. 24. The state court
did not consider this question since it involves the venue provisions of FELA which
is within the purview of Congress. The justifications given for this feature of the
plan are that the legal talent to fight the excellent staffs of the railroads is in the
big cities and that very often the best lawyers in the rural areas and smaller towns
are on retainers for the railroads.
3. This gratuity ranged from $50.00 to $150.00 per case. Brief for Illinois State
Bar Association, p. 20.
4. The "legal aid" department consisted of stenographers, clerks and a research
analyst. The sixteen regional lawyers shared the expenses of the department on the
basis of total recoveries in that region as against total recoveries nationally. The
regional counsel also paid an apportioned share of the cost of the annual brotherhood
convention.
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Illinois Supreme Court for a ruling that the conduct of the lawyers involved
in the plan was neither illegal nor unprofessional. The court ruled
that the plan, as lawyer-financed solicitation, violated the Illinois statute
governing attorney practices; 5 that no financial connection or agreement
as to fee between union and lawyer was permissible; and that the brotherhood investigators could not attempt to induce the injured to sign a contract
employing counsel. The court outlined a plan which it was permissible for
the brotherhood to follow: the union could use brotherhood-paid investigators to urge injured members to employ counsel from a union-recommended
list, and any complaints about excessive contingent fees could be handled
through the grievance committees of the bar associations. In re Brotherhood of RailroadTrainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
The American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, of
which the Illinois statute and most other state laws governing attorneys
are counterparts, proscribe fee-splitting,6 ban control or exploitation of a
lawyer's services by lay intermediaries 7 and prohibit solicitation by lawyers
or their agents. 8 Fee-splitting is deemed harmful because it is thought that
the lay recipient will refer clients to the attorney most remunerative to him
5. For comparable state statutes see Note, 7 VAmN. L. REv. 677, 683 n.41 (1954).
In the instant case the statute banning solicitation which was in issue was ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 13, § 15 (1957), as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person not an
attorney at law to solicit for money, fee, commission, or other remuneration directly
or indirectly in any manner whatsoever, any demand or claim for personal injuries
or for death for the purpose of having an action brought thereon, or for the purpose
of settling the same."
6. ABA CANONS OF PROFFSSIONAL ETvlcs No. 34 (1957) (hereinafter cited as
ABA CANoNs) : "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."
7. Id. No. 35: "The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client
and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should
avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of
such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the
responsibility should be direct to the client. Charitable societies rendering aid to
the indigent are not deemed such intermediaries.

"A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association,
club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should not include the rendering
of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect to their individual
affairs."
8. Id. No. 28: "It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a
lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his
duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other
causes of action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect
judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries
or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to
employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate
policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attackUs or others who may
succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others to seek his professional
services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of
the Bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred,"
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rather than to the most competent attorney.' Where a lawyer's services
are controlled by laymen, as where an organization hires a lawyer to give
free advice to members, it is feared that the lawyer will tend to put the
interest of the organization ahead of that of the client.10 Even agreements
between organizations and practicing lawyers which provide for the giving
of advice to members at established rates are prohibited. 1 Courts decry
solicitation on the grounds that it tends to "stir up litigation," 12 that it is
unbecoming to the dignity of the profession, 13 that an attorney who solicits
might resort to improper methods to win cases,' that lawyers would have
to charge clients higher fees in order to pay "runners" 15 and that the
"runners" would scheme to produce profit from litigation. 16 The courts
have been willing to make some exceptions to the anti-solicitation rule
in the case of personal solicitation by lawyers where the motive was primarily not the material gain of the attorney but rather to aid a personal
friend 17 or to aid those who might not otherwise be able to have the benefit
of counsel.' 8 Within the framework of these canons, the brotherhood's
plan has been attacked with uniform success in the courts of states other

than Illinois. 1"
Upon the enactment of the Federal Employers' Liability Act 2 0 in
1908, the talented legal staffs of the railroads waged such a vigorous and
9. See D~aNiKL, LEGAL ETHICS 179-86 (1953) for a discussion of fee-splitting
and the policy reasons underlying its prohibition.
10. ABA Committee on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Informative Opinion
A (1950).

11. ABA,

OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

No. 56, at 149

(1957).
12. ABA CANONS No. 28, quoted note 8 supra.
13. "[Alttorneys at law practice a profession; they do not conduct a trade. It
is incompatible with the maintenance of correct professional standards to employ commercial methods of attracting patronage." In the Matter of Cohen, 261 Mass. 484,
487, 159 N.E. 495, 497 (1928).
14. See Chreste v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 77, 186 S.W. 919 (1916), aff'd, 178
Ky. 311, 198 S.W. 929 (1917); In, re Brooklyn Bar Ass'n, 223 App. Div. 149, 227
N.Y. Supp. 666 (1928).
15. Ibid.
16. "The evils attendant upon solicitation . . . are more apt to appear when
there is organized solicitation by men who are not members of the profession who
may be tempted by their commercial zeal to stir up litigation and to attempt to create
causes of action where none in reality exist." State v. Rubin, 201 Wis. 30, 32, 229

N.W. 36, 37 (1930).

17. In re McDonald, 204 Minn. 61, 282 N.W. 677 (1938).
18. In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934); ABA, OPINIONS OF THE CoMON PROFEssIONAL ETHICS No. 148, at 308 (1957); see also People ex tel.
,,rr
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Edelson, 313 Ill. 601, 145 N.E. 246 (1924).
19. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1956); In re
O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504,
225 P.2d 508 (1950) ; In re Committee on Rule 28, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 106 (Ct. App.
1933); Opendack v. McDonald, No. 144823, Wash. Super. Ct., June 1956; 5 ARK. L.
REv. 453-55 (1951); 1 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 157 (1951); 39 GEo. L.J. 642 (1951);
64 HAuv. L. Ray. 1374 (1951); 46 ILL. L. Rxv. 323 (1951); 3 STAN. L. REv. 549
(1951). The only case to approve the practices prohibited by the instant court was an
Illinois lower appellate court case. Ryan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Il1. App. 364
(1932). Cases are also pending in Montana and Oklahoma.
20. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
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well-calculated attack upon it in the courts that it became apparent that the
legal talent available to the trainman was inadequate. The situation was
such that the Government employed the Attorney General's office to file
amicus curiae briefs in the First and Second Employers' Liability Act
Cases.2 1 Further, the national policy of the act 22 was being defeated by

railroad claim agents who took advantage of the fear and insecurity of the
injured man or his family to force an inadequate settlement. It was against
this background that the brotherhood adopted its plan aimed at preventing
harassment by claim agents and at securing competent specialized legal
service at a fee below that charged by most practitioners?3 Due chiefly
to favorable Supreme Court construction 2 4 of the FELA, and possibly
to the success of the plan, plaintiffs now recover in approximately ninety
per cent of the cases 2 and the verdicts are usually substantial. 26
By prohibiting payment of the expenses of the "legal aid" department
by the sixteen regional counsel and by forbidding the payment of a gratuity
by the lawyer to the investigator, the instant ruling has dosed an avenue for
disguised fee-splitting that might well detract from the effectiveness of the
plan. The expenses of the "legal aid" department could be padded or be the
result of sinecure positions created for union political purposes. It is
also conceivable that selection or retention of regional counsel under the
brotherhood's plan could be influenced, not by competency, but rather by
the size of gratuities paid to investigators who are in a position to exert
pressure on the union in its selection or changing of counsel. Further, an
investigator deeming his gratuities insufficient could make a less thorough
investigation in order to make the lawyer appreciate the value of his services.
The union investigator may also be lax in bringing the client to the lawyer
as a means of inducing a higher gratuity. This would prejudice the injured
member since promptness in securing counsel to file suit against the railroad has been found to be the most effective means to end the harassment
27
tactics of the claim agent.
21. 207 U.S. 463 (1908); 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
22. 45 CONG. REc. 4041 (1910) : "[T]he employers' liability law

. . . places such
stringent liability upon the railroads for injuries to their employees as to compel the
highest safeguarding of the lives and limbs of the men in this dangerous employment."
23. A full discussion of the ends sought to be attained and of the evils sought to

be remedied is contained in

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN,

REPORT OF THE

262 (1930).
24. Fully discussed in Griffith, The Vindication of a National Public Policy Under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 18 LAW & CoNTM=P. PROB. 160 (1953).
25. Legal Ethics in F.E.L.A. Litigation, 25 TErN. L. REv. 155, 157 (1958).
26. Damnages Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 25 TENN. L. REv. 205
PRESIDENT

(1958).

27. Testimony of Mr. Edward B. Henslee, Jr., Appendices to Brief of ABA as
Amicus Curiae, p. 22. Legal ethics require the claim agent to cease negotiating with
the injured member when his employer is notified that the member is represented by
counsel. DaiNnan, LEGAL ETHICS 201 (1953) (ABA CANONS No. 9 prohibiting such
negotiation applies to the legal department of a corporation by which the claim agent
is employed). There is evidence that such tactics by claim agents still persist. Instant
case at 394-95, 150 N.E.2d at 166.
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Although the instant ruling allows union investigators to urge employment of counsel established by the union to be competent, it appears that
the plan outlined by the court may not adequately protect the aggrieved
party from pressure by the railroad claim agent. Since experience has
shown that advice and recommendation, even from union officials, are often
ineffective in overcoming the reluctance or inability of injured members to
take steps necessary to obtain adequate legal representation, 28 it is unlikely
that the investigators will be any more successful. Nor will the court plan
necessarily secure lower cost legal service for the injured since a lawyer
who has no assurance that he will get enough FELA cases to provide a
steady income and to justify a degree of specialization would probably
charge more than one operating under the brotherhood plan. A bar association grievance committee, which the instant court specified as the body
to police the size of fees, probably would not consider a fee excessive unless
it were patently exorbitant. It is suggested, however, that in FELA cases
where recovery is so probable 2 the bar associations should consider adoption of a relatively lower maximum contingent fee than is permitted in the
typical torts action, even if a lawyer has no assurance of future FELA
cases. High contingent fees are justified on the ground that the high
earning must compensate for the lawyer's efforts in other cases in which
the client's, and therefore the lawyer's, recovery was low or nonexistent.
The justification for a lower fee would be that the trainmen, whose recoveries are virtually assured by laws in their favor, should not be burdened
with the same percentage costs as in actions where recovery is not so
probable. It may well be that lawyers on the union's recommended list will
charge a low fee in order to remain on the list and that the union will limit
the list so that the lawyers will receive enough cases to warrant specialization and lower fees. Even this informal arrangement, apparently sanctioned
by the instant court, may come under attack, since it seems that any attempt
to channelize available legal business is looked upon with disfavor by the
organized bar.30
An alternative arrangement might better accomplish the brotherhood's
objectives without violating the spirit of the canons. If it were permissible
for the union to retain a lawyer on a permanent basis 3' to advise the in28. Griffith, supra note 24, at 171-72.
29. See authority cited note 25 supra. See also ABA CANoxs No. 13.
30. See Note, 7 VAND. L. REv. 677, 684 (1954); 64 HARV. L. Rzv. 1374, 1376
(1950).
31. At least one prominent writer on legal ethics favors such an arrangement
and sees no reason why ABA CANONS No. 35 would prevent it. DRrIKER, LEGAL
ETHiCS 167 (1953) : "It is not believed that the Canon will prevent the labor unions
from finding lawyers to advise their members. The whole modern tendency is in
favor of such arrangements, including particularly employer and cooperative health
services, the principles of which, if applied to legal services, would materially lower
and spread the total cost to the lower income groups. The real argument against
their approval by the bar is believed to be loss of income to the lawyers and concentration of service in hands of fewer lawyers. These features do not commend the
profession to the public." (Footnotes omitted.)
In Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950), there were
strong dissents. Justice Carter said that the plan did not lower the dignity of the
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jured man, soon after his injury, as to the validity of his claim and its
settlement value, the psychological effect of this professional advice may
inure the injured man to action. Further, if the lawyer were permitted, at
the client's option, to engage in negotiations for out-of-court settlement,
in the event of such a settlement the injured man would get a greater net
recovery since a low or nominal rate for such a service could be set by
agreement. Such a practice would be prohibited by the presently accepted
interpretation of the canons 32 because of the fear that the attorney's
allegiance will be divided between union and client. It is suggested that
this apprehension is unreal and that there is little reason to fear divided
allegiance. Canon 35 excepts charitable organizations, such as legal aid
societies, from its prohibition against organization-hired lawyers giving
free advice, apparently because the identification of interest of the charity
with that of its indigent clients is such as not to give reason to fear divided
loyalty.3 3 The collective bargaining powers of unions presently encompass
almost every phase of employer-employee relations so that the welfare of
the member is in large part fused with that of his union. In England a
system of union counsel as is outlined above has been in extensive operation
at least since 1934 and, in fact, other organizations in England offer broad
legal services without suggestion by the English bench or bar that they are
At least one American jurisdiction, Pennsylvania,
illegal or unethical.4
has a statute 5 which permits labor unions to employ lawyers to give
advice to members on matters pertaining to their employment. These
lawyers represent members before workmen's compensation and unemployment compensation boards.3 6 It is difficult to conceive how a
lawyer would be involved in conflicts of interests between union and member if the advice given is restricted to problems arising between employer
and employee. Since FELA is the railroader's equivalent of workmen's
compensation, it does not appear very different from the standpoint of
the ethical considerations of divided loyalty to allow a union-hired lawyer
37
to go at least as far as to advise the injured or to negotiate a settlement.
profession, being "nothing more than a proper joining of forces for the accomplish-

ment of a proper legal objective of mutual protection. . . . Thus, we do not have a
case where the purpose, motive and result is the stirring up or exciting of litigation.
. . . The essential object of the instant plan is iwt to obtain clients for an attorney.
It is to enable the organization (the Brotherhood) to assist its membership in a
matter of vital concern to them." Id. at 515-17, 225 P2d at 515-16.
32. See authority cited note 10 supra.
33. Ibid.
34. Weihofen, "Practice of Law" by Nan-Pecuniary Corporations: A Social
Utility, 2 U. CHn. L. RLv. 119 (1934).
35. PA. STAT. ANr. tit. 17, § 1612 (Supp. 1957). There has been no reported
litigation testing the effectiveness of this act.
36. Letter from Peter J. Swoboda, Assistant Manager, Pa. Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, to University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
Nov. 28, 1958, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
37. It must be conceded that once an identity of interest between organization
and member is shown there should be no ethical objection to allowing the lawyer to
go as far as representing the member in trial litigation; however, such a proposal
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Among the arguments which would be made against such a plan for
advising would-be litigants is that it "stirs up litigation." But the decision
of the instant court to allow union investigators to urge members to hire
lawyers with a view to litigation is itself a recognition that "stirring up
litigation" is sometimes desirable and perhaps even necessary. A more
realistic approach would be that "stirring up litigation" is illegal and unethical when it is purely for the material gain of the attorney without strong
social goals to justify such litigation, or when the litigation is unfounded in
fact. Writers have criticized the wooden application of this epithet "stirring
up litigation" s since it appears that the protection of individual rights
often demands that organization and individual urge recourse to law to
assure that those aggrieved by wrongdoers get just compensation. Recent
experiences in the field of race relations bear testimony to the proposition
that the protection of fundamental rights sometimes requires that litigation
be stirred up in order to protect the ignorant and timorous.8 9 While it may
be that there will be an increase in litigation due to the efforts of the union
investigators, it appears that much of this litigation will result in fulfilling
the aim of FELA 4 0 -more adequate compensation of the injured.

TRUST

COMPANIES

ENJOINED

FROM

PROBATING

WILLS,

PREPARING

ACCOUNTS AND MAKING DECISIONS INVOLVING LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES

The Connecticut State Bar Association brought suit to restrain defendant trust companies from engaging in the alleged unauthorized practice
of law. The trust companies were disseminating to the public general information concerning laws pertaining to wills and trust agreements, reviewing wills and trust agreements, drawing various instruments in the course
of fiduciary administration, drafting and filing papers in probate court,
and appearing before probate courts in their role as fiduciaries. Some of
the trust company employees carrying on these activities were members of
the bar; others were not. The Supreme Court of Errors held that, in
advertising and in reviewing wills and trust agreements, the defendants
would probably meet a great deal of resistance at present because of the conservative
attitude of the bar in retreating from the position that wholesale legal services are
unethical.
38. See PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CoimmwON LAW 134 (1921): "It will not do
to say to the population of modern cities that the practical cutting off of all petty
litigation, by which theoretically the rights of the average man are to be maintained,
is a good thing because litigation ought to be discouraged. . . . In truth, the idea
that litigation is to be discouraged, proper enough, in so far as it refers to amicable
adjustment of what ought to be so adjusted, has its roots chiefly in the obvious futility
of litigation under the conditions of procedure which have obtained in the immediate
past. . . . Moreover, there is danger that in discouraging litigation we encourage
wrongdoing, and it requires very little experience in the legal aid societies in any
of our cities to teach us that we have been doing that very thing."
39. See NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va.), prob. jurs. noted, 79

Sup. Ct. 33 (1958).
40. See note 22 supra.
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acted primarily for themselves for the purpose of obtaining clientele. Hence
these activities were not found to be the unauthorized practice of law. The
remaining activities were held unauthorized since they were "commonly
understood to be the practice of law" and were performed for the benefit of
others. State Bar Assn v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 140 A.2d 863
(Conn. 1958).1 On remand for further proceedings the trial court enjoined
defendant trust companies from representing any estate or trust
"in any proceeding, conference, or negotiation wherein the legal
rights, liabilities, or interests of . . . any parties interested therein
are to be adjudicated, defined, determined, compromised or settled
by any . . . order . . . of any Probate Court or . . . tax department. . . ,,2
It is well established by court decision 3 or by statute 4 that a corporation may not practice law either directly or indirectly through its employees.5
In applying this rule to trust companies, courts have uniformly enjoined
them from drafting wills, 6 most trust agreements, 7 escrow agreements,8
and from advertising the ability to draft such instruments. 9 Trust com1. For lower court decision see State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust

Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 248. 131 A2d 646 (Super. Ct 1957).

2. State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 42, 144
A.2d 347 (Super. Ct. 1958). The specific prohibitions of the court forbade, inter
alia, "(1) the admission of a will to probate; (2) the determination of domicil
and heirs at law and all jurisdictional questions arising therefrom; (3) widows'
allowances; (4) applications for permission to sell the assets or fiduciary estates;
(5) the valuation of closely held corporations and of interests such as leasehold
estates and remainder interests; (6) the determination of what dividends and accrued
interest shall be included in the inventory of a fiduciary estate; (7) the determination
of ownership of household property; (8) the compromise of claims for and against
a fiduciary estate; (9) the determination of whether or not claims against an estate
have been properly presented, of questions relating to statutes of limitation, and
what, if any, priorities may exist in order of payment of claims against insolvent
estates; (10) the determination of whether or not transfers were made in contemplation of death . . .; (12) the completion of federal estate tax returns involving
jointly owned property, marital deductions and transfers prior to death; (13) the
preparation and filing of preliminary and final accounts; (14) the making of the
necessary calculations in the distribution of estates-unless represented by a member
of the bar of this state in good standing who is not an officer, employee, servant or
agent of said defendant. . . ." Id. 144 A.2d at 352-53.
3. E.g., Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N.W. 365 (1937);
Judd v. City Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937).
4. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 25-205 (1947); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-102 (1947);
MICH. COmP. LAws § 450.681 (1948).
5. See generally FLErCHEa, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2524 (rev. ed. 1950).
6. Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W2d 408
(1954), 4 DE PAUL L. Ray. 311 (1955), 8 S.C.L.Q. 260 (1955).
7. In re Eastern Idaho Loan & Trust Co., 49 Idaho 280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930);
Judd v. City Trust & Say. Bank, 133 Ohio St 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937). But see
Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939). See also
note 11 infra.
8. Judd v. City Trust & Say. Bank, supra note 7, and cases cited note 3 supra.
9. Land Title, Abstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650
(1934).
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panies have been permitted to draft simple chattel mortgages, bills of sale,
deeds and promissory notes in connection with settlements in which the
trust company is interested,' 0 and to draft revocable, nondonative, nontestamentary trust agreements." Trust companies may also advertise the
desirability of wills and trust agreements and suggest themselves as
executor or trustee.' 2 The courts are in conflict regarding what activities
a trust company may lawfully perform in administering the corpus of a
trust or estate,13 and regarding the extent to which the probate procedure
14
may be handled by a trust company.
The rationales given by courts in enjoining legal activities of trust
companies and other corporations include: the inherent inability of a trust
company to receive a personal license; 15 the high degree of professional
knowledge and skill which a lawyer must have and which a corporation is
incapable of having; 16 the fear that courts will have less control over corporate employees than they have over individual attorneys and therefore
that a lowering of the ethical standards of the bar will result; 17 and the
belief that the relationship of trust and confidence which must exist between a lawyer and his client will be endangered if the lawyer is subjected
to possible divided loyalties because he serves both the client and the corporate employer.' 8 It is suggested that none of these reasons adequately
explains the result in the instant case.
The inherent inability of a corporation to obtain a personal license
has been no bar to corporate activity in other professional areas where
individual members of the profession must be licensed. Thus, corporations
have been allowed to engage in architecture 19 and pharmaceutics without
any apparent detriment to the public.20 Hired attorneys can provide the
corporation with the requisite knowledge and skill to handle legal problems, and the courts could control corporate unethical practices in a manner
10. Cain v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 66 N.D. 746, 268 N.W. 719

(1936).
11. Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 216, 276 N.W. 365 (1937).
This type of trust agreement, often referred to as a simple trust agreement, is often
looked upon as a private contract between the settlor and the bank under which the
trust company acts merely as manager of the settlor's funds. Since no third party
is affected the courts have not interfered.
12. Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408
(1954). But see Groninger v. Fletcher Trust Co., 220 Ind. 202, 41 N.E.2d 140 (1942).
13. Ibid.
14. 6 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2524.1, at 354, and cases cited therein.
15. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
16. 6 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 5, § 25.24, at 341, and cases cited therein.
17. Ibid.
18. In. re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910). This relationship, a discussion of which appears in the instant case, is the most frequently
mentioned reason for restricting the practice of law to members of the bar in good
standing. The instant court also relied upon the inherent impersonality of a corporation. 140 A.2d at 870.
19. Messer Co. v. Rothstein, 129 App. Div. 215, 113 N.Y. Supp. 772 (1908).
20. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
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similar to that now used to control attorneys. For example, a corporation
could be fined or enjoined from the practice of law permanently or for a
stated period of time.
The court in the instant case felt that by enjoining all trust company
activity which involved anything "commonly understood to be the practice
of law," it prevented conflicting interests and thus preserved the attorneyclient relationship. It would seem that to force the trust company to retain
an outside attorney to protect interests which conflict with those of the
company would place this attorney also in a position of possible divided
loyalties-to his corporate client and to the interests which he is supposed to
protect.21 Even if the greater independence of the private practitioner, as
opposed to the dependent position of the corporate employee, is a sufficient
safeguard against conflicts of interest, the granting of an injunction prohibiting trust companies from performing all legal activities is a measure
more sweeping than the possibility of conflicts of interest requires. Unlike
the situation where a trust company drafting a will might be tempted to
suggest trusts with itself as trustee, it is difficult to envision conflicts of
22
interest arising from many of the activities enjoined by the instant court.
Finally, the regulation of trust companies by statute 2 and by the common
law 24 and the dependence of any trust company on the absolute faith and
confidence of the community in its honesty would appear to virtually guarantee that the trust company will not abuse its position and that outside
attorneys will be retained in those few instances where one is in fact
needed.j To so state, however, is not necessarily to conclude that the
instant court was incorrect in the result it reached. It is suggested that
the foregoing rationales are attempts by the courts to verbalize the essence
of professional legal practice. The first cases in the area of corporate legal
practice arose at a time when many lawyers felt that commercialism was
destroying the ideals of the profession.26 Even today the profession does
not think of itself as primarily concerned with financial gain.27 Considering
21. See Merrick v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 107 F.2d 271, 278 (D.C. Cir.
1939).
22. See note 2 mPra.
23. "An indirect check on the . . . honesty of professional trustees . . . and
on the soundness of their policies, is provided by states and the nation through the
examination of the affairs of . . . trust companies. . . . The purpose of such
examinations is . . . to discover . . . whether any self-dealing or dishonesty has
crept into the fiduciary work. . . ." 4 BOGERT, TRusTs & TRUSTEEs § 980 (1935).
24. There is a common-law "duty [enforceable in equity] to make full disclosure
and otherwise to treat the cestui with utmost frankness and fairness. . . . The
doctrine is enunciated in some Codes. . . . 'A trustee may not use the influence
which his position gives him to obtain any advantage from his beneficiary."' 3

id. § 544.

25. Indeed, evidence was presented in the instant case that the trust companies
did resort, from time to time, to the use of outside counsel. 140 A.2d at 866, 867.
Considerations such as those discussed in text at notes 18 through 25 supra have
led at least one writer to conclude that certain corporations should be permitted to
"practice law." Note, 44 H~Av. L. REv. 1114 (1931).
26. See DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 24, 25 (1953).
27. Id. at 5.
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the client as a person, and not simply as a customer, is thought to be an
integral factor in the making of legal decisions. 28 The bar apparently feels,
and the courts agree, that permitting corporate legal practice unduly emphasizes the commercial aspects of the practice of law at the expense of its
personal aspects to the eventual detriment of bar and public alike. The
instant decision, therefore, may be read as an attempt to maintain the
29
professional ideal as it is now constituted.

In each of the preceding cases and in the following case the particular
problem involved was, in part, an outgrowth of a more basic problem facing
the bar-specialization in the law. Kovrak,' in effect, is asking that he be
excused from showing his competency in general Pennsylvania law because
he wishes to practice only federal tax law. The Connecticut Trust Companies 2 invaded the practice of law in part because they were able to attain
a prominence in the trust field by specialization in that area. The Railroad
Brotherhood 3 was attempting, inter alia, to secure the advantages of
attorney specialization for its members. And the Jacksonville Lawyer
Reference Service 4 was attempting, among other things, to create a method
by which clients could contact specialists when it permitted members to
list specialties. Since resolution of these problems by the courts is at best
a symptomatic treatment, it is suggested that, until some satisfactory solution to the underlying attorney specialization problem is worked out by the
bar, similar cases will arise with increasing frequency.
The advantages of specialization are many. One who devotes his time
and energy to a narrow area of the law will have a better general knowledge of the field, will be more alert to the controlling features in any specific
problem, will be better able to keep abreast of changes, and will be likely
to maintain more complete library facilities in his field. A broad system
of specialization would aid the attorney with a general practice by permitting
him to turn to specialists when he has a complex problem in an area in
which the achievement of competence on his part would be uneconomical
in relation to the size of the problem. To the client this increase in competency and proficiency can be important. The advice he gets on the
narrow problem he presents may well be sounder, and, although the
specialist may legitimately command a greater fee per hour, the total fee
of the specialist is likely to be lower because of his increased efficiency.
28. Id. at 4. It may be argued that this personal element is present in trust companies. Bankers have long been considered by the public as professional men in whom
trust and confidence may be placed by those in need of business advice.
29. See, e.g., People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill.
50, 56-57, 199 N.E. 1, 3-4 (1935).
1.
2.
3.
4.

See pp. 404-09 in!fra.
See pp. 398-402 supra.
See pp. 392-98 supra.
See pp. 388-92 supra.
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But specialization has the disadvantage of restricting the attorney's
focus with the possible loss of awareness of the wider scope of the law.
Rare is the important trust problem, for example, that does not involve
questions of tax law or future interests. If the trust is to be litigated,
evidence, procedure, and even constitutional law 5 problems may arise. It
is the general practitioner who can best see the narrow problem in its
larger setting and keep related problems from arising. In spite of this,
specialization among attorneys, as a perusal of the biographical section of
Martindale-Hubbell 6 will show, is prevalent not only in the large firm and
large city but also on the part of small firms and individuals practicing in
medium-sized cities. 7 As this specialization has evolved, additional problems have arisen. No standards have been set to test the ability of the
attorney who professes to specialize; no effective method has been established by which a client may readily find the specialist he needs; the current de facto specialist by holding himself out to the public at large as
an attorney with a general practice is, in fact, misleading the public as to his
field of competency; 8 and more might well be done in the way of specialist
bar associations, whose members could work for the solution of mutual
problems. 9
Perhaps no single plan will promote the most effective use of specialists
and solve all of these problems. 10 However, further use of intra-bar
organizations for each specialist group may serve to raise the specialist's
level of competency. Permitting wider use of titles such as "utilities
specialist," "domestic relations attorney," or "tax consultant" in advertising
5. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denclda, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
6. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL, LAW Dmaw RY (19th ed. 1958).
7. Analytically, specialists fall into two basic groups: the specialist firm or individual in practice, and the specialist individual workng in a firm having a more general
practice. The problems of these two groups are different, and those problems posed
in the text are related chiefly to the former. Indeed, the banding together of many
specialists into one firm holding itself out to the public as engaging in general practice
is one solution to the problems presented in the text accompanying notes 10 and 11
infra. However, such firms as they grow in size present new problems to the professional ideal. For example, the concepts of personal responsibility and intimate
attorney-client relationship, ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETrics No. 35 (1957),
become strained.
8. This was one of the problems in Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d
889, appeal dismissed, 79 Sup. Ct 95 (1958). Although Kovrak ostensibly held himself out as a federal tax specialist, there is some evidence that he gave advice on
negligence problems from time to time. Ginsburg v. Kovrak, Findings of Fact
No. 5, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 615, 617 (C.P. 1958).
9. Some progress has been made in this direction. There are a number of sections
in the American Bar Association in what might be called specialty areas of the law.
See, e.g., Sections of Public Utility Law; Real Property, Probate and Trust Law;
and Taxation. There are also independent organizations such as the American
College of Trial Lawyers.
10. The following writers have suggested solutions to the specialization problem:
Eveld, A Realistic Appraisal of Legal Specialization, Case & Com., Sept.-Oct. 1957,
p. 32. Joiner, Specialization in the Law: Control It or It Will Destroy the Profession, 41 A.B.A.J. 1105 (1955) ; Siddall, A Retort to ProfessorJoijer's Call for Control,
42 A.B.A.J. 625 (1956).
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either to other members of the bar," the public or both may facilitate the
bringing together of client and specialist, and keep the public from being
misled. Specialized bar examinations may be necessary to insure that
these specialists have a minimum level of competency. These remedies
in turn may create new, although not insurmountable, problems. New rules
with regard to ethical limits of attorney advertising would have to be
formulated; methods of dividing income between the lawyer with the general practice and the specialist whom he utilizes or to whom he refers a
client may have to be devised; new standards of competency would be
required. It is submitted that the bar must begin now on the solution of
these problems. 12 Failure to do so will result in a less efficient use of
present specialists, litigation such as that in the four cases here discussed,
and perhaps a lessening of the lawyer's clientele in favor of non-lawyer
specialists in the tax, real estate, fiduciary, and accounting fields.

The professional ideal requires that the organized bar protect the public
and itself from the incompetent and the corrupt within its own ranks. Since
law is also a business, great caution is required before a man is denied
the right to earn a living in the way he has chosen. 13 This raises a twofold
problem: a substantive one of determining by what acts a man shows
himself unfit to practice law and a procedural one of determining the standard of due process 14 required to deprive a man of the right to follow his
chosen profession. These problems, difficult enough under a unitary
structure such as that of a state, become more difficult when interwoven
with the complications of federalism and its parallel court systems. The
following three cases deal with attempts by the bar, working within the
framework of federalism, to keep its membership free from the allegedly
unfit without unduly hampering the freedom of the individual concerned.

ADMISSION TO PRACTICE BEFORE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT HELD

To

NOT

AUTHORIZE MAINTENANCE OF LAW OFFICE CONTRARY TO LAW OF

STATE IN

WHICH COURT SITS

The Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Philadelphia Bar
Association brought an action to enjoin defendant from practicing law and
maintaining an office in Philadelphia, and from using the title of attorney
or similar term conveying the impression that he was entitled to practice
law. The action was based upon the Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the
11. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL Emics
ETHics 242-45 (1953).

No. 46 (1957);

D~iNmm, LEGAL

12. For attempts already made by the bar see Editor's Note, 41 A.B.A.J. 1105
(1955).
13. See Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
14. Ibid.
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unauthorized practice of law.1 Defendant had been admitted to practice
before the United States District Courts for the District of Columbia 2 and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvanias the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, 4 and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Although
he was never admitted to practice before any Pennsylvania court, defendant had practiced federal tax law in Philadelphia for approximately fifteen
years, had maintained an office there, and had held himself out to the public
6
as an attorney and "Federal Tax Consultant." An injunction was granted,
and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. Ginsburg v. Kovrak,
392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 79 Sup. Ct. 95 (1958).
States control the right to practice at their bars pursuant to their
police powers.7 In admitting applicants to the federal bar, the federal
courts often follow the state standards, reasoning that it would be undesirable to establish a second and very similar admissions system when
the advantages of such a system would be slight.8 One federal circuit court
has expressed its approval of a district court requirement of prior admission
to the local state court on the ground that otherwise there would be a
"grave" danger that admission to the federal court would be used to avoid
the state's standards and yet engage in practice within the state. 9 Where
the practitioner has not been granted the right to practice before a federal
court or agency, there is no doubt that the state law determines whether
1. "[F]rom and after the passage of this act, it shall not be lawful for any
person, partnership, association, or corporation, in any county in the State of Pennsylvania, to practice law, or to hold himself, herself, or itself out to the public as
being entitled to practice law, or use or advertise the title of lawyer, attorney-at-law,
attorney and counsellor-at-law, counsellor, or the equivalent in any language, in such
manner as to convey the impression that he, she, or it is a practitioner of the law
of this or any other state, nation, country or land, or, in any manner, to advertise
that he, she, or it, either alone or together with another person or persons, has, owns,
conducts, or maintains a law office, or law and collection office of any kind, for the
practice of the lawr of this or any other state, nation, country or land, without having
first been duly and regularly admitted to practice in a court of record of any county
of this Commonwealth in accordance with the regularly established rules governing
such admissions. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (1933).
2. October 12, 1943.
3. October 15, 1943. The admission was based upon prior admission to the
District Court for the District of Columbia which qualified as the "Supreme Court
of a State!' under rule 3 of this court.
4. December 6, 1943.
5. March 17, 1947.
6. Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 11 Pa.D. & C.2d 615 (C.P. 1958).
7. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (6 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) ; see Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); litre Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894)
cf. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (medical profession).
8. "This Court (as well as the federal courts in general) does not conduct independent examinations for admission to its bar. To do so would be to duplicate
needlessly the machinery established by the states whose function it has traditionally
been to determine who shall stand to the bar." In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 287
(1953).
But see Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1956) (disbarment
proceeding) : "The two judicial systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal
judiciary, have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers, among whom,
in the present context, lawyers are included."
9. Application of Wasserman, 240 F.2d 213, 215 (9th Cir. 1956).
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10
State courts have taken diverhe is entitled to practice within the state.
gent positions as to whether one who has been admitted to practice before
a federal court or agency which sits in the state may engage in the outof-court incidents of such practice when he has not been admitted to any
of the courts of that state. The Florida Supreme Court held that an individual authorized to practice before the United States Supreme Court,
the Tax Court of the United States, and the United States Treasury
Department, but not admitted to any Florida court, would be violating
the state's unauthorized practice statute if he opened an office and practiced as a "Federal Tax Counsel" in Florida." Similarly, an individual
admitted to practice before the United States Patent Office, although not
admitted to practice before any court of law, was enjoined from practicOn the other hand, in an action to
ing as a patent attorney in Illinois.'
the Interstate Commerce Combefore
client
a
representing
for
recover fees

mission, where plaintiff was authorized to practice only before the Commission, the Supreme Court of Missouri overruled a demurrer to the
complaint.' 3 Although admitting that the contract covered the practice of
law, the court stated that the Interstate Commerce Act 14 generally superseded the state's unauthorized practice statute. In a California case dealing with an allegation of unauthorized practice against an applicant for
admission to its bar, the court did not consider exclusively federal practice
5
as violative of a statute similar to the one in the instant case.'
6
involves
One constitutional problem presented by the instant case
state
and
federal
the
of
the conflict between the respective jurisdiction
10. E.g., In re Lyon, 301 Mass. 30, 16 N.E.2d 74 (1938).
11. Petition of Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953). The court approved a finding
that: "the practice contemplated by petitioner was not governed exclusively by rules
of the United States Courts and Departments but that this court had jurisdiction of
the petitioner and the rules of procedure and the laws of Florida require that he be
a member of the Florida Bar to practice here." Ibid.
12. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Kellogg, 338 Ill. App. 618, 88 N.E.2d 519 (1949),
appeal denied, 341 Ill. App. at xiv (1950). The court said: "The fallacy of defendant's
argument lies in the implication that the Patent Office had the right to permit the
exercise of prerogatives which are forbidden under the laws of the State of Illinois
as constituting unauthorized practice. No such authorization was issued by the
United States Patent Office to defendant, nor was the power inherent in the Patent
Office to permit the defendant to practice law." Id. at 626, 88 N.E.2d at 523.
13. DePass v. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S.W.2d 146 (1940).
14. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
15. Ex parte McCue, 211 Cal. 57, 293 Pac. 47 (1930). The court limited the
application of the statute as follows: "The State Bar Act [citation omitted] and other
statutes enacted for the purpose of regulating the practice of law in this state are
applicable to our state courts only. The federal courts are governed entirely by
federal enactments and their own rules as to admission and professional conduct. This
state, should it attempt, and we do not think it has, to regulate the practice of law
in the federal courts or to place any restrictions or limitations upon the persons who
might appear before the federal courts within this state, would be acting entirely
without right and beyond its jurisdiction." Id. at 66, 293 Pac. at 51.
16. This Comment does not treat the fourteenth amendment problems of due
process, equal protection or privileges and immunities, each of which the defendant
raised.
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governments to regulate the practice of law by persons admitted to the
federal bar. In order for the defendant to assert federal supremacy 17
over the unauthorized practice statute he must show a legitimate federal
authorization to establish an office without regard to state regulations. The
federal authorization would of necessity derive from the judiciary clause
of the Constitution 1 8 and the constitutional mandate that Congress "constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." 19 Congress in establishing the system has given to the inferior courts the right to enact their
own local rules.20 The local rule which defendant contends authorizes
him to establish an office without regard to state regulations is the Resident Counsel Rule of the United States Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, providing:
"Except where a party conducts his own case, no bill or other
pleading and no notice required to be signed by counsel shall be accepted by the clerk unless it is signed by a solicitor who shall have been
admitted to practice in this court, who shall be a resident of and maintain an office in this district, and who shall have entered his appearance
of record in the case with the address in the district where notice can
be served." 21

Assuming for the purpose of this consideration that the rule does authorize
defendant to establish an office, there remains the question of whether the
authorization is a "necessary and proper" 2 adjunct to the judiciary
clauses.
The Supreme Court has recently indicated that the test to be applied in order to determine if Congress has acted within the bounds of
the necessary and proper clause is whether there is a reasonable relation
between the means and the end.2 4 The basis of the reasonable connection
between the power to constitute inferior courts and the authorization of
attorneys practicing in those courts to have local offices without regard to
the state laws would be as follows: the inferior courts require a bar to
17. U.S.

CoNsT.

art. V, §2.

18. "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9.
19. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl.
20. "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel, as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1952).
21. Quoted in Letter from the Clerk of the United States Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania to University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Nov. 12, 1958,
on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. (Emphasis added.)
22. U.S. CoxsT. art. 1, § 8, cl.18.
23. The leading statement of the meaning of the necessary and proper clause was
made by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316
(1819), as follows: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
are constitutional." Id. at 421.
24. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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operate, and, in order to engage in an effective practice, the members of
that bar must be able to do more than merely appear in court; they must
be able to open an office to meet clients and prepare their cases, and to
engage in all of the other out-of-court elements of practice without interference by the state in which the court sits. It would appear, following the
liberal tests applied by the Supreme Court, that the power for a federal
court to grant this authorization does exist. 25 It is, therefore, relevant to
inquire whether the rule of the Eastern District did provide the authorization which defendant claims. In light of past deference to state laws, 26 it is
unlikely that a federal court would have created this conflict with local law
without more express indication that it was so doing. The purpose of the
rule appears to be securing to the parties an adequate means for service
of papers,2 7 a purpose which could be accomplished without nullifying the

state law in respect to federal attorneys. Moreover, the one federal court
that has interpreted a similar rule did not find that a conflict with state law
was intended. 28 Therefore, the conclusion appears valid that the district
court did not intend its Resident Counsel Rule to preclude the injunction
granted by the Pennsylvania court. In addition, other considerations would
indicate that the court did not intend such a result. These considerations
would also indicate that an amendment of the rule specifically authorizing
defendant to open an office would be unwise. There would seem to be no
25. It is possible that the Supreme Court could find a rule granting authorization
to open a local office, irrespective of state regulations, improper without considering
its constitutionality. It could exercise its power as arbiter of the rules of the inferior
federal courts and strike down the rule. See, e.g., Sacher v. Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, 347 U.S. 388 (1954), in which the Supreme Court reversed the
lower federal court and held that disbarment was too great a punishment for the
activities of the petitioner.
26. In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953).
27. In the letter from the Clerk of the Court, mipra note 21, it was stated that
there are in existence two resident counsel rules in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-

vania. The one quoted in text accompanying note 21 supra was the former rule in
equity to which the Clerk has referred in answering all inquiries since the abolition
of the distinction between law and equity by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1938. The rule at law, quoted in the letter, more clearly indicates the intention
of the court in promulgating the rules. The text of the rule reads as follows: "Attorneys and Counsellors at Law, admitted to practice in this Court, who are not
residents of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and who do not maintain an office
in said district for the regular transaction of business shall, in each case or proceeding
in which they appear, have a resident associate counsel who maintains an office in
said district, upon whom all notices, rules and pleadings may be served in accordance
with the rules and practice of this Court, and who may be required to attend before
the Court, Clerk, Commissioners, Auditors, Assignees, Trustees, Referees, or other
officer of the Court or before Notaries Public in cases where testimony may be taken
before them in accordance with the rules and practice of the Court. The attendance
of said associate counsel shall be a sufficient appearance for the party or parties whom
they so represent."
28. Piorkowski v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 131 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The
court stated: "Compliance with Rule 4 of the General Rules of this Court requires
that there be designated in the initial notice or pleading an attorney who maintains
an 'office' in New York; but the maintenance of an office by an attorney in New
York State presupposes that the attorney is admitted to the Bar of New York State.
If the moving parties [attorneys admitted to the state courts of New Jersey, but
not those of New York] are, as attorneys, maintaining an office in New York, they
are not complying with the laws of New York." Id. at 554.
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need for federal action in this area. Indeed, a number of federal district
courts have indicated a willingness to follow the state rules by promulgating
local rules which require admission to the state court of the state in which
the district is located as a prerequisite for admission to their bars. 29
Further, the interests of the states must be considered when determining
whether federal action should be taken. Because of diversity jurisdiction,
the Erie R.R. v. Tompkins3 0 doctrine, and such pervasive areas as due process, state citizens frequently have their state-created rights and interests adjudicated by the federal courts. Thus, in many cases the states would
appear to have as great an interest in insuring that the rights of their
citizens are adequately represented in the federal courts as in a state court.
As a practical matter, removing from the states the power to determine
whether federal attorneys may open a law office and hold themselves out
to the public as attorneys would place these attorneys beyond the control
of the policing committees of the local bar associations, which committees
are probably the only effective regulating device existing today.3 1 Under
these circumstances it appears undesirable for the United States Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, or for any other federal court, to
exercise the power which it has in regard to the out-of-court incidents of
the practice of attorneys admitted to its bar.

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT REFUSAL To ADMIT TO PRACTICE ATTORNEY
OF STATE IN WHICH COURT SITS REVERSED WITH DIRECTION To ADMIT
UNLESS ATTORNEY FOUND NOT PRESENTLY OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER

Upon conviction in 1954 of bribery, fraudulent conversion, and illegal
sale of law books to the city of which he was the mayor, applicant was given
a suspended sentence upon condition that he resign his office. Although the
indictments did not arise out of his professional activities as an attorney, he
was suspended from the practice of law for six months by the county court.
After reinstatement he served as a member in good standing of the county
bar and of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In 1958 his admission to
the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania was moved by
a member of that bar. At the request of the presiding judge, who inquired
into the issue on his own motion, applicant's criminal record was shown.
29. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant on Appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States, app. B.

30. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31. There would be no well coordinated or effective way to insure that the individual would restrict himself to the limits of his authority to practice federal law.
See also text accompanying note 9 supra. Allowing such members of the federal
court's bar to open offices within a state would permit a budding attorney to select
the state bar examination he wanted to take, gain admission to the supreme court of
that state, subsequently gain admission to the local federal court in the state where he
desired to practice (since many of the federal courts grant admission on the basis of
admission to the highest court of any state), and open an office within that state without meeting the state's requirements.
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To fulfill the admissions requirements of the court 1 applicant then offered
evidence of present good moral character, including a recommendation
from the president judge of his county court. Admission was denied. The
court of appeals held that the district court erroneously gave controlling
weight to applicant's previous convictions without considering his present
character, and reversed the order with instructions to grant admission
unless the district court found applicant not to be presently of good moral
character. Matter of Dreier, 258 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1958) .2
By statute all federal courts are empowered to make rules prescribing
qualifications for admission to practice before them.3 An almost universal
requirement has been that the applicant be of good moral character.' Applicants whose backgrounds have included criminal, or alleged criminal, acts
have received varied treatment. Commission of a crime does not necessarily
show absence of good moral character.5 To justify denial of admission,
courts generally have required that the crime be a felony 0 or one involving
moral turpitude. 7 There is available, however, no judicial definition of the
requirement sufficiently precise to be of much help in determining whether
particular conduct indicates the lack of present good moral character.8 In
1. The rule on admissions adopted by the district court is as follows: "Any

person of good moral and professional character, residing in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania or maintaining an office therein for the practice of law, shall be entitled
to admission as an attorney and counselor of this Court, if such person shall have been

previously admitted to practice in the Supreme Court of the United States, the Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania."
Instant case at 69.

2. See also State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Tibbels, 92 N.W.2d 546

(Neb. 1958).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1952).
4. See Crotty, Requirentents for Admission to Practice in the Federal Courts,
in

SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFEssION, REPORTS ON BAR ExAtINATIoNS AND REQUIRE-

123-50 (1952); Wickersham, The Moral Character of Candidates for the Bar, 9 A.B.A.J. 617 (1923). See also note 1 vtpra.
5. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957) ; In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286
MENTS FOR ADmissION TO THE BAR

(1953) ; United States v. Parks, 93 Fed. 414 (C.C.D. Colo. 1899).
6. In re Tinkoff, 101 F2d 341 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 552 (1939);
it re Tinkoff, 95 F.2d 651 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 573 (1938) ; Ex parte
Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
7. It appears that the meaning of moral turpitude is as muddled as that of good
moral character. For example, the court in Bartos v. District Court, 13 F.2d 138
(D. Neb. 1926), in determining that the manufacture of home brew during prohibition
was a crime involving moral turpitude, cited many cases in a detailed opinion. On

appeal, Bartos v. District Court, 19 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1927), it was held, with
further lengthy citation, that such activity did not involve moral turpitude. See also

Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses That Justify Disbarment,
24 CAwIF. L. REv. 9 (1935).

8. In taking a case by case approach, most courts make no attempt to articulate the

considerations by which good moral character is to be determined. A fairly typical
example of the infrequent and relatively unhelpful formulations is that found in In re

Farmer, 191 N.C. 235, 238, 131 S.E_ 661, 663 (1926), which defines the upright
character necessary for attorneys as "includ[ing] all the elements necessary to make up
such a character. .

.

. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should

have acquired, through association with his fellows.

It means that he must have

conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, should or does.
Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least

resistance, but quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing, if it is right, and
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the federal system the general rule is that the individual determination
is left largely to the discretion of the district courts,9 with review of the
district court's determination only when there has been an abuse of discretion.1 However, some courts have recently indicated a willingness to
review even without a finding of abuse." State denials of admission have
2
been overturned by the Supreme Court as being violative of due process.'
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners'8 a state court denied admission
on the basis of prior arrests, use of aliases, and membership in the Communist Party, all of which had occurred at least fifteen years before. The
Supreme Court held that giving controlling weight to acts of that nature,
involving no moral turpitude and occurring so far in the past, violated due
4
process.'
It appears desirable to allow the district court a wide range of discretion
in determining whether applicants should be refused admission on the basis
of a lack of good moral character. In the final analysis ascertainment of
good moral character is a personal judgment; general formulations are of
little help.' 5 The district judge is in a better position than the appellate
the resolve not to do the pleasant thing, if it is wrong.

. . . Even more is this true
when the restoration of character, as here, is the subject of consideration."
The problem of defining good moral character is frequently presented in naturalization proceedings, since the statute requires that an applicant be of such character
for the five years preceding his application. Immigration and Nationality Act, 66
Stat. 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1952). In this situation, too, judicial attempts to define
the standard and weigh conduct against it have not been notably successful. For an
extensive critique see Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 838
(1951). The act has been amended to specify certain conduct which will be sufficient
to exclude. 66 Stat. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1952).
9. See In re Chopak, 160 F.2d 886 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 835 (1947);
Carver v. Clephane, 137 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1945); In re Schachne, 87 F.2d 887
(2d Cir. 1937); Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 4 F.2d 422 (D.C.
Cir. 1925), aff'd, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
10. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 233 (1824), is the case most often cited
for this proposition. In that case, Chief Justice Marshall said, at 234, "[T]he court is
not inclined to interpose, unless it were in a case where the conduct of the circuit or
district court was irregular, or was flagrantly improper." See also cases cited note 9
supra and Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318, reversing 173 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir.
1949).
11. Sacher v. Bar Ass'n, 347 U.S. 388 (1954) (twenty-four years of unblemished
conduct marred only by a six-month sentence for contempt makes permanent disbarment unnecessarily severe) ; In -rePatterson, 176 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1949) (discipline of young United States attorney for conflict of interest justified but too severe) ;
In re Doe, 95 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1938) (disbarment after acquittal of criminal charge
unjustified unless district court found that attorney actually engaged in misconduct).
12. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
13. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
14. For analyses of the Schware proceeding in the state court, Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304, 291 P.2d 607 (1955), see Note, 65 YALE L.J. 873
(1956) ; 33 DicrA 361 (1956) ; 24 KAN. B.A.J. 362 (1956). For discussions of the
implications of the Supreme Court reversal, see The Suprene Court, 1956 Term,
71 HARv. L. Rxv. 83, 154 (1957); Comment, 56 MicH. L. REv. 415 (1958); 20 GA.
B.J. 406 (1958) ; 26 KAN. B.A.J. 431 (1958).
15. The efforts of commentators to devise a more lucid formulation of the standard
by which good moral character is to be judged have been no more successful than those
of the judiciary. See cases cited note 9 supra. One writer, after an extended analysis
of the historical origins and the general considerations involved, indicates the futility
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courts to ascertain and evaluate the attitude of the community toward the
individual. His awareness of the mores of society and their application to
the applicant at that time and in that place will produce at least as good, if
not a better, determination than the circuit court could make. 1 Furthermore, it is in his court that the applicant wishes to practice. The judge
should not feel the need to act as a watchman of the attorney practicing before him, and this is the probable result if he must accept the character judgment of another court, a judgment with which he disagrees. At the same
time the harsh impact of denial on the individual attorney, together with the
possibility of decisions influenced consciously or unconsciously by personal
prejudice and undeserved public unpopularity, make it seem equally desirable to maintain some check on the power of those courts to deny
admission. Indeed, it could be argued that the very amorphousness of the
standard of good moral character requires that the appellate court carefully review denial-of-admission cases to assure that the standard is evenly
applied to all applicants. That lower court discretion is not unlimited is
illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in the Schware case.1 7 This
review, however, should reflect the fact that in most cases the lower court
is better equipped to judge applicant's character than is the appellate court,
and thus reversals should be limited to those cases in which the lower court
of applying a label to the requirement. Nonetheless, he concludes that the character
required encompasses the general principles of "Judaeo-Christian morality, which
embodies the natural law as recognized by all men .

.

. " and terms the man who

possesses such character as the "law-abiding traditionalist." Starrs, Considerations
on Determinationof Good Moral Character,18 U. DET. L.J. 195-206 (1955). Another
writer, examining the moral turpitude that is sufficient to bar admission, thinks that
the problem is solved by analogizing to the military label, "officer and gentleman."
Thus, he would decide the question by determining whether the applicant's acts were
"unbecoming a lawyer and a gentleman." Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion
of Offenses That Justify Disbarment, 24 CAiF. L. Rzv. 9, 24 (1935). Dissenting
in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951), Mr. Justice Jackson contended that
moral turpitude was too vague a standard on which to base a deportation. He minimized the utility of using a label, saying at 241-42: "We should not forget that
criminality is one thing-a matter of law-and that morality, ethics and religious
teachings are another . .
. We tread on treacherous grounds when we undertake
to translate ethical concepts into legal ones, case by case. We usually end up by
condemning all that we personally disapprove and for no better reason than that we
personally disapprove it. In fact, what better reason is there?"
16. It has been argued by one leading authority, however, that local committees
and judges, especially in cases of reinstatement, are too often moved by sympathy
for the barred attorney and his family, and that reinstatement has often been too
swift. Drinker, Legal Ethics, 297 ANNALS 37, 40 (1955). This argument may be
especially cogent in the instant case, since applicant's county is a small one, and he
was, as mayor of a city of 20,000 people, a well-known figure. However strongly
this may apply to the county action in the instant case, it seems less forceful against
the district judge, who was sitting in another community. In any event to the extent
that this argument is based upon concern over the dangers of misplaced sympathy,
it supports the conclusion that the local judges should be allowed broad power to
deny admission to those individuals whose integrity they question. The argument
may be more deeply rooted, however, in the fear that the local judges are too closely
associated with the situation to assess the applicant's character with the desired
objectivity. Admittedly this fear is not groundless. But familiarity with the situation
is an advantage as well, and the proper balance between the merits and defects of the
local judge's position would seem best achieved by the grant of broad discretion
coupled with limited review.
17. See also Matter of Levy, 348 U.S. 978 (1955), reversing per curiam 214 F.2d
331 (5th Cir. 1954).
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has exceeded any reasonable measure of discretion. In determining whether
this measure has been exceeded, several factors may be available for consideration by the appellate court. Since a denial of admission is virtually
always based on acts of misconduct, the initial inquiry would properly be
into the nature of this misconduct. 18 Whether the reviewing court should
also consider affirmative evidence of good character-for example, lapse
of time since the proved misconduct, or favorable recommendations of
members of the bar-may depend upon the character of the misconduct in
question. This misconduct may lie anywhere in the wide range from
relatively innocent misdemeanors to the most heinous crimes. At one
extreme the acts may be so innocent that basing a denial of admission
upon them would not be justified regardless of how recently it occurred
or how unconvincing favorable recommendations might be. At the other
extreme conduct may be so heinous that no quantum of favorable character
evidence could overcome it. Between these extremes, however, the extent
to which the misconduct is indicative of the individual's ability to act with
integrity would seem to be best determined by considering it in connection
with the time of its occurrence, together with any favorable recommendations presented. In this area, then, the boundaries of the district court's
discretion are dependent upon the balance of both the favorable and unfavorable evidence of moral character.
The precise grounds upon which the instant court rested its decision
are not clear. To the extent that the decision represents a holding that
the sum total of the evidence bearing on applicant's moral character is
insufficient to bring it within the area in which the district court may
properly exercise its discretion, it seems incorrect. The facts of the instant
case are significantly different from those present in Schware, the only
case relevant to this issue cited by the court. In the instant case applicant's
convictions for bribery and fraudulent conversion while holding the office
of mayor represent his failure to act with the requisite integrity in a relationship of trust. It is precisely because it is felt that an attorney, constantly
entering this type of relationship, must be a person whose integrity is
beyond question that the requirement of good moral character is imposed. 19
Moreover, in addition to being felonious 20 the crimes for which he was
convicted would seem to involve moral turpitude under any definition 21
and are thus grounds for denial of admission under the traditional concepts
of good moral character.22 Schware, on the other hand, was convicted of
18. No attempt is made herein to formulate a test by which the value of this

misconduct as proof of bad moral character may be judged. It must be recognized
that such an attempt could achieve no greater success than similar attempts to define
moral turpitude, or good moral character itself. See notes 4-9, 16 supra and accompanying text.
19. See Matter of Williams, 158 F. Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1957).
20. Fraudulent conversion, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4834 (1939); receipt of
bribe by officer or employee of city, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 35910 (1951).
21. See cases cited note 6 supra.
22. See notes 5. 6 mipra and accompanying text.
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no crime. Nor would it seem proper to characterize his acts as involving
moral turpitude. Considering the period during which they occurred,
his activities appear more on the order of intellectual deviations, not directly
reflecting upon his character or ability to act with integrity as an attorney.p
Admittedly four years have elapsed since applicant's conviction. But
neither this fact nor the evidence of "repentance and rehabilitation" emphasized by the court 24 seem to outweigh the evidence of lack of integrity
to the extent necessary to compel the conclusion that applicant's character
is sufficiently above reproach so as to preclude denial of admission.
It is possible, however, to read the opinion as holding merely that
the trial court must consider any available evidence of present good moral
characteras rather than deciding solely on the basis of the nature of past
misconduct. For reasons set forth above as bearing upon the proper scope
of appellate review,2 6 this position seems proper, at least when the misconduct is of the nature of that present in the instant case. Under such a
reading, the lower court remains free to exercise the discretion properly
granted it to balance the evidence of present good moral character against
the past demonstration of its absence, and to deny or grant admission
accordingly.
23. In connection with his activities as a labor union organizer during the early
1930's, Schware had been arrested, but never prosecuted, for criminal syndicalism. At
that time, the union organizer was received by employers with somewhat less than
enthusiasm. A similar situation existed with regard to his activities in the Communist Party, which at the time was a recognized political group on the ballot in
many states. See 353 U.S. at 241, 244-46.
24. Instant case at 69. The court is apparently referring to the fact that there is
no indication of applicant's having misbehaved during the past four years and to the
fact that his period of suspension from the county bar has terminated. Since, basically,
the good moral character demanded of an attorney is capable of conclusive proof only
in the negative, it is questionable how much weight should be given the abstention
from misbehavior during the four years immediately following the commission of
a felony of the nature of that here involved. This is not to suggest, of course, either
that all applicants be considered "bad" until proven "good," or that felons cannot
reform. But the failure of experts far more experienced than the district judges to
predict with accuracy the likelihood of a repetition of past misconduct can be readily
seen by a casual glance at the records attained by pardon boards. For a questioning
of the wisdom of relying too heavily on the favorable action of the local bar, see
note 16 supra.
25. Practically, this interpretation of the decision will insure only that the district
court on remand admits all relevant offered evidence of applicant's present character.
The court in the instant case was able to determine that the district court did not
consider the evidence of applicant's character since the record showed that the lower
court refused to hear the affirmative recommendations offered. In the normal case,
appellate courts can determine only whether or not all the relevant offered evidence
was admitted in the proceeding below. Judges are not required to explain, and their
opinions seldom reveal, how, in the process of judging, they have apportioned the
weight to be given to the various factors before them, and upon which they based
their decision. But as the district judge is to be given a very wide range within
which his discretionary findings will not be overturned, this limitation on the ability
of the reviewing court to scrutinize the evaluation below is not prejudicial to the
operation of the proposed system. Furthermore, the requirement that all relevant
data which is offered be admitted will insure that the record available to the appellate
court contains the factual materials necessary for a proper evaluation of the application and the district court's disposition of it.
26. See text accompanying notes 16, 17 sitpra.
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CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE FOR CONTEMPT ACTIONS REJECTED
IN DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING AGAINST ATTORNEY FOR PUBLIC CRITICISM
OF PENDING LITIGATION WHILE SERVING AS COUNSEL OF RECORD

Appellant delivered an address condemning Smith Act prosecutions in
general and attacking in particular the administration of such a prosecution
then pending before the United States District Court for the Territory of
Hawaii, in which appellant was appearing as attorney of record. Upon
investigation, the Hawaii Bar Association found the appellant to have said
"that horrible and shocking things are going on at [the] trial; that a fair
trial was impossible; that all the rules of evidence were made up as the case
proceeded; and that unless the trial was stopped in its tracks certain new
crimes would be created." 1 The matter was then referred to the Supreme
Court of Hawaii, Committee on Legal Ethics and Unauthorized Practice, 2
which charged violation of the American Bar Association's Canons of
Professional Ethics 3 and recommended disciplinary proceedings. Upon
order to show cause, the supreme court, without receiving new evidence
or calling witnesses, sustained the charges and suspended appellant for
one year.4 The United States Court of Appeals affirmed.3 In re Sawyer,
No. 15,109, 9th Cir., June 9, 1958, cert. granted, 79 Sup. Ct. 553 (1958).
The right to free speech," although taken by the courts as a command
of the broadest scope,7 is not absolute,8 for the "societal value of speech
1. Bar Association of Hawaii "Complaint Under Rule 19," filed with the Supreme
Court of Hawaii, July 8, 1954, and quoted in instant case at 4. References to instant
case are to page numbers in the court's opinion.
2. The matter was submitted to the committee for further investigation in conformity with rule 19 of the Supreme Court of Hawaii. The Hawaii Supreme Court
Rules appear at 40 Hawaii 755 (1955).
3. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS No. 1 (1957) (hereinafter cited as
ABA CANONS) : The Duty of the Lawyer to the Courts, adopted by the American
Bar Association, August 27, 1909: "It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards
the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. . . ." ABA
CANONS No. 22. This canon provides, inter alia, that a lawyer, as an officer of the
law, is charged "with the duty of aiding the administration of justice." The Canons
of Professional Ethics of the ABA were adopted by the Hawaii Bar Association on
August 15, 1939. See HAWAII BAR ASS'N, CoNSTITUTION AND BY-LAws art. X
(1939).
4. In re Sawyer, 41 Hawaii 270 (1956). A second charge involving petitioner's
visit to and receipt of an affidavit from a juror subsequent to the Smith Act trial
appears not to have been considered by the supreme court in view of the suspension
ordered as a result of the first charge. Similarly, the second charge is only briefly
considered upon review. Instant case at 20-21. See also In re Sawyer, 256 F.2d 553
(9th Cir. 1958), which suspended execution of the judgment pending appeal.
5. Two judges dissenting.

6. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
7. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 265 (1941).
8. Debs v. United States,-249 U.S. 211 (1919).; Frohwerk v. United States, 249

U.S. 204 (1919); Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 139 F. Supp. 837, 840 (N.D. Ill.
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9
must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations."
One such consideration is the necessity of preventing interference with the
orderly administration of justice.'0 Typically," the balance between the
desirability of free discussion and fair adjudication has arisen in contempt
proceedings, wherein the courts in recent years have applied the clear and
present danger rule.12 By this rule the power to punish utterances is limited
to instances where the substantive evil that the utterances present is
extremely serious and the degree of imminency extremely high.' 3 The
Supreme Court has not yet been presented a case in which, upon the balance
of these interests, it has held that the utterances constituted a sufficiently
clear and present danger of interference with the orderly administration
of justice to remove the speaker's constitutional protection. 14 Moreover,
the Court has reversed state court convictions of contempt based upon the
following: an editorial, while a motion for new trial was pending, which
labelled a trial judge's directed verdict as "high-handed" and a "travesty
on justice"; 15 editorials, during proceedings prior to jury trial, which so
impugned the integrity of the trial judge as to create public distrust of
him; 1 an editorial, subsequent to verdict but before sentence, stating that
the trial judge "will make a serious mistake if he grants probation, [because] this community needs the example of their assignment to the jute
mill." 17 It has also been held that the newspaper publication, while a

1956).

As was stated in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1930), "No one

would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary requirements of decency may be
enforced against obscene publications."
9. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1950).
10. People ex rel. Barton v. American Auto Ins. Co., 282 P.2d 559, 662 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Sullens v. State, 191 Miss. 856, 4 So. 2d 356, 361 (1941);
State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E.2d 8, 10 (1954). See also dicta in cases
cited note 11 infra.
11. But see, e.g., People ex rel. Barton v. American Auto Ins. Co., 282 P.2d 559
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955) (quo warranto proceeding); State v. Bomer, 179 Tenn.
67, 162 S.W.2d 515 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 771 (1942) (disciplinary proceedings).
12. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
The rule was first stated in
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
13. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 272-73 (1941).
14. For cases involving the balance of other considerations against free speech
where the activity was held to be a clear and present danger, see Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Smith Act prosecution); American Communications
Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (labor relations); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357 (1927) (criminal syndicalism).
15. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
16. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
17. Quoted in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 272 (1941)
Times editorial).

(Los Angeles
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motion for new trial was pending, of a telegram from defendant labor
leader, which referred to the trial judge's decision as "outrageous" and
which threatened a labor strike should the court's decree be enforced, lacked
the requisite seriousness and imminency.' 8 Echoing throughout each decision was the observation that the threat of interference cannot be predicated
upon the assumption that the trial judge was not a man of fortitude nor
able to withstand public opinion,' 9 although it was acknowledged that "conceivably a campaign could be so managed and so aimed at the sensibilities
of a particular judge and the matter pending before him as to cross the
forbidden line." 20
Ignoring for the moment appellant's role as counsel of record, her accusations, in light of the clear and present danger rule as applied in the above
decisions, appear to be protected by the first amendment. Her address was
primarily concerned with Smith Act 2 1 prosecutions in general and was

without explicit reference to the trial judge in the particular case.2 2 No
threats of retributive action were expressed or implied. It can not be
assumed that the judge was of such sensitive fiber as to be influenced by
such an attack. However, the instant case differs from the above decisions
in that not only was the trial pending but the jury had not yet reached its
verdict. Since members of the jury cannot be presumed to have the
fortitude of a judge to withstand pressure from an aroused public, the
threat of interference with their decision would appear greater than in
previous cases.P However, appellant's address was delivered in a small
town 24 on the island most distant from the locus of the trial, and, even
in view of possible newspaper coverage, 25 the likelihood that its impact
would be conveyed to a juror in the form of aroused public opinion is at
28
least questionable.
18. Ibid. (Bridges' telegram).
19. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1947) ; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273-74 (1941). But
see concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp v. Florida, supra
at 350.
20. Craig v. Harney, supra note 19, at 376.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. V, 1958).
22. The majority opinion acknowledges this fact: "It is quite true that Mrs.
Sawyer's harsh comments did not incorporate Judge Wiig by name." Instant case
at 15. In none of the cases cited in note 19 supra was there a jury decision pending
at the time of the alleged contemptuous publications.
23. See generally concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Pennekamp
v. Florida, 338 U.S. 331, 350 (1946).
24. Honokaa, with a population of slightly over 1,000.
25. The majority observes that the appellant "might have expected her remarks
were such as would be published." Instant case at 12.
26. See generally the opinion of the dissenters who "have a very different view of
the facts" in this case, and who state that "the same absence of a clear and present
danger which voided [the contempt cases of Bridges, Pennekamp and Craig] would
make the Hawaii court's judgement in this case a prohibited restriction on free speech
even if the speech had expressly included the judge in the supposititious manner
indicated." Instant case at 61.
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The majority rejected the cleat and present danger rule with the bald
assertion that "this is not a contempt case" 7 and with the observation that
appellant was attacking pending litigation in which she was counsel of
record. This would indicate that the court felt that the same remarks
made by a lay person in criticism of the courts, while insufficiently dangerous to constitute contempt, might, if made by an attorney of record in
pending litigation, be grounds for disbarment. The long recognized distinction between contempt and disciplinary proceedings 28 is based on the
ground that the purpose of the former is to punish,2° whereas the purpose
of the latter is to protect the courts, the profession and the public from
persons unfit to continue in the practice of law.30 While this distinction
may be useful in explaining the summary nature of disciplinary proceedings,31 it should not of itself warrant a relaxation of the protection of free
speech; a person ought no more to be judged unfit because of the exercise
of his rights under the first amendment than ought a person to be judged
not of good moral character because of the exercise of his rights under
32
the fifth amendment.
Nevertheless, a person's status is a relevant circumstance to be considered in appraising the threat posed to the orderly administration of
justice by a particular address or publication. In the instant case it might
be argued that, to the extent that appellant's close personal contact with
the subject matter rendered the criticism more persuasive than would have
been the same criticism from a layman, it posed a greater threat. On the
other hand, it is more likely that her attack was automatically tempered by
the audience's suspicion of bias. While society's dependence upon respect
for the judiciary might particularly be undermined by criticism from the
legal profession, it seems equally plausible to argue that "an enforced
silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of
27. Instant case at 15.
28. In re Duke, 82 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 650 (1937);
In re Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 66 A.2d 675 (1949).
29. In re Patterson, 176 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1949) ; In re Vaughn, 189 Cal. 491,
209 Pac. 353 (1922) ; It re Keenan, 287 Mass. 577, 192 N.E. 65 (1934).
30. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).

31. It is on this ground that it is generally held that the manner in which disciplinary proceedings shall be conducted is a matter of judicial regulation. Toft v.
Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A-2d 671 (1955). All states except Georgia, North Carolina and Texas allow judicial discretion to dispense with trial by jury. DRiNKE,
LEGAL ETHics 35 (1953). Many do not require confrontation of witnesses, Brooker,
The "Right" To PracticeLaw, 1 DuKE B.J. 249, 250 (1951), or the application of the
normal rules of evidence, In re Tracy, 197 Minn. 35, 266 N.W. 88 (1936). However,
in all jurisdictions the attorney does have the right to a full hearing with ample
notice. DilNKER, op. cit. supra at 35. In the instant case the supreme court made
its determination on the record before the committee without receiving new evidence
or calling witnesses. However, since appellant had stipulated that this was to be the
manner of her proceeding and since she did appear and was heard, there is no issue
as to procedural due process.
32. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt
much more than it would enhance respect." 3 Furthermore, not only
society but the judicial system should gain from public discussion by those
who through their experience are qualified to be critical, subject to assurance under the clear and present danger rule that the gains will not be
offset by a loss from improper interference. The same arguments seem to
apply to the attorney who is counsel of record in litigation which is attacked.
The majority's observation that the trial was still pending underscores a
factor which has long been considered significant. It has been said that
"when a case is finished, courts are subject to the same criticism as other
people, but the propriety and necessity of preventing interference with the
course of justice by premature statement, argument or intimidation hardly
can be denied." 34 While it is obvious that criticism is more likely to
interfere with the course of justice while the litigation is in progress, this
is precisely the time in which the public would be most receptive to the
fullest possible discussion. Thus, it would appear that the court should
have applied the clear and present danger rule, since it would strike at the
substantive evil-interference with the administration of justice-while
permitting free discussion of matters of public concern.
33. Instant case at 60.
34. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1906)

Holmes).

(opinion by Mr. Justice
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CORPORATION LAW-1957 AMENDMENTS TO PENNSYLVANIA
BUSmNESS CoRPoRATIoN LAw HLD NOT To PREcLTuDE DISSENTING
SHA_ HOLDERS FRoM ASSERTING APPRAIsAL RIGHTS UPoN DE
FACTO MERGER
A reorganization agreement calling for Glen Alden, a Pennsylvania
corporation,' to purchase the assets 2 of List Industries, a Delaware holding
4
company,8 was approved at Glen Alden's annual shareholders' meeting.
The agreement also provided for the dissolution of List, the assumption
by Glen Alden of all of List's liabilities, 5 the issuance of 3,621,703 shares
of Glen Alden stock for distribution to List shareholders, 6 and the change
of Glen Alden's corporate name to List Alden Corporation, with the
7
present directors of both corporations becoming directors of List Alden.
Plaintiff, a Glen Alden shareholder who had voted against the transaction,
contended that the agreement contemplated not a purchase, but a de facto
merger entitling dissenting Glen Alden shareholders to appraisal rights
under section 908A of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law,8 and
filed a suit in equity to enjoin Glen Alden and its officers from proceeding
1. Prior to 1955 Glen Alden was engaged primarily in mining, processing and
distributing anthracite coal. Since that time the company has diversified its operations
to embrace the manufacture of air-conditioning units and fire-fighting equipment.
Instant case at 428, 143 A.2d at 26; List Industries Corp. and Glen Alden Corp. Proxy
Statement 6, March 20, 1958.
2. The assets include over $8,000,000 cash held chiefly in the treasuries of List's
wholly owned subsidiaries. A small amount of cash was reserved for payment of
List's expenses in connection with the transaction. Instant case at 429, 143 A.2d at 27.
3. List owns interests in motion picture theatres, textile companies and real estate,
and to a lesser extent, in oil and gas operations, warehouses and aluminum piston
manufacturing. Instant case at 428-29, 143 A.2d at 26.
4. Plaintiff alleged that the resolution approving the reorganization would have
been defeated had not the corporation specifically advised the shareholders that they
had no dissenters' rights. Instant case at 431 n.5, 143 A.2d at 28 n.5; Brief for Appellee, p. 38.
5. The liabilities include a $5,000,000 note incurred by List in order to purchase
Glen Alden stock in 1957, as well as outstanding stock options, incentive stock option
plans, and pension obligations. Instant case at 429, 143 A.2d at 27.
6. In order to accomplish the necessary distribution, Glen Alden was to increase
the authorized number of its shares of capital stock from 2,500,000 to 7,500,000 shares
without according pre-emptive rights to the present shareholders upon the issuance
of any such shares. Instant case at 429, 143 A.2d at 27. The disposition of the appeal
made it unnecessary for the court to consider whether the Glen Alden shareholders
had any pre-emptive rights in the proposed issuance of shares, an issue raised by
plaintiff. Instant case at 439 n.9, 143 A.2d at 31 n.9.
7. List would hold eleven of the seventeen directorships on the new board of
directors. Since the stockholders of List would hold 76.57 of the outstanding shares
of the new corporation, as compared with 23.5% retained by the present Glen Alden
shareholders, continuing control by the List directors would be assured. See instant
case at 434-35, 143 A.2d at 29.
8. "If any shareholder of a domestic corporation which becomes a party to a
plan of merger or consolidation shall object to such plan of merger or consolidation
such shareholder shall be entitled to . . . [the fair value of his shares upon
surrender of the share certificate or certificates representing his shares]." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §2852-908A (1958).
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with the reorganization. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, affirming a
grant of injunctive relief,9 held that the attributes of the transaction were
those of a merger rather than a purchase, and that the fact that the transaction was not consummated according to the statutory merger scheme did
not preclude the grant of appraisal rights. Farris v. Glen Alden Corp.,
393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
Appraisal statutes 10 confer upon a shareholder who dissents "1from
a proposed transaction the right to withdraw from the enterprise and receive
the fair value 2 of his shares. Where the proposed transaction is a merger
or consolidation, 13 availability of appraisal is widespread: fifty American
jurisdictions now grant the remedy in such situations.' 4 Appraisal is also
granted by thirty jurisdictions for a sale of all or substantially all the corporate assets, and by fifteen jurisdictions in the case of certain charter
amendments.' 5 None, however, confers the right upon the shareholders
of a corporation purchasing the assets of another corporation. Ultimate
determination of a dissenting shareholder's right to appraisal may thus
depend upon whether the particular transaction is a merger or a sale, and
if the latter, upon which corporation is the purchaser and which the seller.
Prior to the instant case when the transaction, although nominally a purchase and .sale, altered the character of the enterprise in much the same
manner as would a statutory merger, the Pennsylvania courts characterized
it as a de facto merger, making appraisal available to the shareholders
9. Entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Equity No. 4,
May Term 1958.
10. For early development of these statutes, see, e.g., Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARV. L. REv. 233 (1931); Levy,
Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Paynent, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 420

(1930).

11. For a discussion of the procedure to be followed under the various statutes
in order to qualify as a dissenter, see Note, 38 VA.. L. REv. 915, 922-24 (1952).
12. What constitutes "fair value" is as much an enigma in the appraisal area as
it is in other contexts. See Kaplan, Problenu in. the Acquisition of Shares of Dissenting Minorities, 34 B.U.L. REv. 291 (1954) ; Robinson, Dissenting Shareholders:
Their Right to Dividends and the Valuatim of Their Shares, 32 CoLum. L. REv. 60,
66-78 (1932) ; Note, 16 BROOKLYN L. REv. 86 (1949) ; Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 442 (1954).
13. Strictly speaking, a merger is the absorption of one corporation by another,
the absorbing corporation retaining its name and corporate identity with the added
capital, franchises and powers of the absorbed corporation. A consolidation is a
union resulting in the creation of a new corporation and the termination of the constituent ones. See 15 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7041 (perm. ed. rev. repl.
1938). For purposes of this Comment, the term "merger" shall be used as including
both types of transactions.
14. Skoler, Some Observations on the Scope of Appraisal Statutes, 13 Bus. LAW.
240, 241 (1958).
15. Id. at 243, 245. This lack of uniformity has been criticized because it often
enables a corporation to avoid payment to dissenters by choosing a readjustment
device under which the statute gives no appraisal rights. See id. at 241; Hills, Consolidation of Corporations by Sale of Assets and Distributim of Shares, 19 CALIF. L.
REV. 349 (1931); Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Shareholders, 27 COLM. L. Rxv.
547, 564 (1927). New York provides the broadest coverage. See N.Y. STOCK CORP.
LAW §§20, 38(11), 85(7), 87, 91(7), 105(9).
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Sections 311F 17 and 908C 18 of the Pennsylvania

Business Corporation Law, added by amendment in 1957 and expressly
eliminating dissenters' appraisal rights for the shareholders of a corporation
which purchased the assets of another, were apparently intended, at least
by the drafters,' 9 to change the result in these cases.20 In the instant case,
however, these amendments were termed "inapt" to accomplish such a
result in the present transaction. 2 ' The court reasoned that they applied
only to "purchases [of] assets of another corporation without inore," and
held that where the transaction includes the assumption of the "seller's"
liabilities, issuance of stock for distribution to the "seller," and other
22
incidents of merger, dissenting shareholders are entitled to appraisal.
16. Bloch v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 75 Pa. D. & C. 24 (C.P. 1950) (acquisition of assets accompanied by exchange of shares and other incidents of merger);
cf. Marks v. Autocar Co., 153 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (sale of assets for stock
of purchaser in connection with dissolution of the seller). See also Troupiansky v.
Henry Disston & Sons, 151 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (sale of assets in exchange
for shares of purchaser). The court in the Bloch case held that a common-law right
of appraisal existed for the dissenting shareholders, relying on the case of Lauman v.
Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858) (merger enjoined until defendant put up
security for payment to plaintiff of the value of his shares).
Bloch v. Baldwin
Locomotive Works, supra at 36-38. In answer to a contention that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether a de facto merger had occurred, the court said: "[T]he
dissenting shareholder stands helpless to protect his rights unless and until some way
is found to determine whether a merger is in fact taking place. The court of equity
have been given the statutory authority and responsibility under the 'Business Corporation Law' . . . to determine finally, the fair value of a dissenting shareholder's
shares of stock. We see no reason, therefore, why equity should not also have
authority to determine whether or not a merger has in fact taken place, where the
statute is not followed by the corporations involved." Id. at 34.
17. "The shareholders of a business corporation which acquires by sale, lease or
exchange all or substantially all of the property of another corporation by the
issuance of stock, securities or otherwise shall not be entitled to the rights and
remedies of dissenting shareholders ...
"
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, §2852-311F
(1958).
18. "The right of dissenting shareholders . . . shall not apply to the purchase
by a corporation of assets whether or not the consideration therefor be money or
property, real or personal, including shares or bonds or other evidences of indebtedness of such corporation. The shareholders of such corporation shall have no right
to dissent from any such purchase." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-908C (1958).
19. See PENNsYLvANiA BAR Ass'N, 61ST ANNUAL REPORT 277, 284 (1957),
reprinted in instant case at 436 n.7, 143 A.2d at 30 n.7; Mulford, Corporate Distributions to Shareholders and Other Anzendiments to the Pennsylva ia Business Corporation Law, 106 U. PA. L. Rayv. 536, 563 (1958).
20. Sections 311F and 908C were intended by the drafters to overrule Bloch v.
Baldwin Locomotive Works, 75 Pa. D. & C. 24 (C.P. 1950). An amendment was
also added to § 311A with the intent of overruling Marks v. Autocar Co., 153 F.
Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1954). The amendment provided that a sale of assets in connection with dissolution or liquidation proceedings be governed by article XI of the
Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law, which article makes no provision for the
granting of appraisal rights. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 15, § 2852-311A (1958).
The
instant case, in holding that appraisal rights will lie in a de facto merger, would seem
to preclude this amendment from accomplishing the overruling of the Marks decision.
21. Instant case at 437, 143 A.2d at 31.
22. Ibid. This interpretation made it unnecessary for the court to consider whether
the 1957 amendments could constitutionally be applied to the instant transaction to
divest the plaintiff of his right to appraisal. See instant case at 439 n.9, 143 A.2d at
31 n.9.
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Antedating statutory authorization for corporate mergers and sales
of assets upon approval of the holders of a specified majority of the outstanding shares 2 was the general common-law requirement of unanimous
stockholder approval for certain corporate changes of a fundamental character.24 Legislative relaxation of this strict common-law requirement, so
unsuited to modern corporate needs, was in many instances accompanied
by the enactment of appraisal statutes. Underlying the various doctrinal
explanations for this development 20 is the basic policy judgment that a
shareholder who is unwilling to consent to a drastic change in the corporation should be permitted to withdraw at a fair price.2 6 On the other
hand, corporate objection to the appraisal device is based largely on the
fact that it impairs flexibility-the resultant drain of cash in paying off
dissenters may be so great as to make the transaction completely unworkable, or may be serious enough so that the other party will no longer look
27
favorably upon the transaction.
23. Many states require more than a 50% majority vote to approve a merger
or consolidation. Variations as to class voting are numerous. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §291, at 685 (rev. ed. 1946). In Louisiana and Oklahoma, the right of
appraisal may be cut off if 80% or 90%, respectively, of all the shareholders vote in
favor of the proposed change. LA. R-v. STAT. § 12:52 (1950) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1.158 (1953). For criticism of this method of eliminating appraisal rights,
see Skoler, Some Observations on the Scope of Appraisal Statutes, 13 Bus. LAW.
240, 241-42 (1958).
24. The case law in the area of fundamental corporate change is somewhat confusing; the decisions involve varying interpretations of contract relationships between
the corporation and the state, the corporation and the shareholders, and between the
shareholders themselves. See Lattin, A Primer on Fuintanental Corporate Changes,
1 W. R-s. L. REv. 3 (1949). In the case of a sale of assets and dissolution of a
prosperous corporation the unanimity rule was based on an implied contract among
the shareholders to pursue the purpose for which the corporation was chartered.
Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1921); Kean v. Johnson,
9 N.J. Eq. 401 (Ch. 1853). However, a strong minority of both courts and commentators reject this doctrine and sales of assets upon less than unanimous consent
have been permitted at common law. See Beidenkopf v. Des Moines Life Ins. Co.,
160 Iowa 629, 142 N.W. 434 (1913) ; Paterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., 186
Minn. 611, 244 N.W. 281 (1932); Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N.H. 351, 82 Ati.
1014 (1912); Warren, Voluntary Transfers of Corporate Undertakings, 30 HARV.
L. REv. 335, 358 (1917). Professor Ballantine speaks of the implied contract doctrine
as "erroneous." BALLANTiNE, CORPORATIONS §281, at 666 (rev. ed. 1946). The
unanimity rule in the merger and the change-of-share contract situations was dependent on whether the state had reserved the right to amend or repeal corporate
charters, and, if so, whether such reservations could be applied ret-oactively to previously existing corporations. Some doubt arose as to the validity of legislation
authorizing these changes on less than unanimous consent of the shareholders. Appraisal was, in some instances, thought necessary to validate such legislation. The
prevailing view has come to be that such reserved power is retroactive in its application, and enactments granting authority to merge on less than unanimous shareholder
consent can constitutionally be applied to corporations already in existence. Thus,
the general rule today is that appraisal is not necessary to validate such legislation.
See, e.g., BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 290 (rev. ed. 1946); 15 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CoRPoRATIONS § 7049, 7050, 7063 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1938); Lattin, mupra; Levy,
supra note 10, at 423, 426, 427.
25. See note 24 supra.
26. Levy, supra note 10, at 421; see Lattin, Minority and Dissenting Shareholders'
Rights in Fundamental Changes, 23 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROR. 307, 308-10 (1958).
27. In the instant case it was stated that Glen Alden would not be able to proceed with the transaction were dissenters granted appraisal rights. Instant case at
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If the purpose of appraisal is to permit a dissenting shareholder to
withdraw when his corporation undergoes a drastic change, theoretically
the grant of appraisal should be determined by the degree of change
present in the individual transaction. The infinite variation present in
modern corporate transactions, however, makes it virtually impossible to
phrase a statute so as to make appraisal available only in those transactions
in which the magnitude of the change renders the grant desirable, and the
adoption of general categories thus seems necessary. The categorization
adopted by most jurisdictions is to classify transactions initially as either
mergers or purchase/sales, granting appraisal to the shareholders of all
participating corporations if the transaction is of the former class. 28 There
appears to be some justification for this distinction. The likelihood of
drastic change-great increase in size, expansion into new and different
types of business, alteration of the share structure, and revolution in company policies-seems greatest when a merger is effected. On the other
hand, a purchase of assets, conceptually at least, is a relatively uncomplicated transaction by which a corporation expands through acquiring
existing facilities instead of itself building them, with the selling corporation
using the transaction as a step in dissolution. Of course, a merger does not
necessarily involve substantially greater change in the nature of a corporation than does a purchase and sale of assets. But in terms of probabilities, the present statutory categorization seems fairly consistent with
the drastic change rationale. The difficulty with the formula arises as
transactions which are nominally purchase/sales begin to acquire the
attributes of mergers and thus no longer fit clearly into the traditional
classifications. The problem is then presented, as in the instant case, of
defining "merger" for purposes of applying the statutory formula. One
rather easy alternative, of course, is to grant or deny appraisal on the basis
of the always-present labels attached by the parties, that is, in accordance
with the form by which the transaction is effected. Arguably, this is the
solution which the Pennsylvania legislature, or at least the drafters of the
1957 amendments to the Business Corporation Law, intended.2 9 Thus, for
purposes of granting appraisal, a transaction might be considered a merger
only if the statutory merger scheme is followed. This test is simple to
apply, and its result predictable with virtual certainty. Moreover, it permits
the directors and majority shareholders greater flexibility in the conduct of
corporate affairs. Its effect, however, is to permit the parties themselves
to determine whether in a given transaction appraisal is to be granted to the
431 n.5, 143 A.2d at 28 n.5. Furthermore, Glen Alden has a $14,000,000 tax loss
carry-over which is due to expire in the years 1958 through 1962. Brief for Appellants, p. 6. Rapid diversification into a profitable line would thus seem to be the best
method of insuring maximum utilization of the tax loss carry-over.
28. If the transaction is classified as a purchase/sale, a further distinction between
seller and purchaser would be necessary in those jurisdictions which grant appraisal
for a sale of assets. Thus, in these jurisdictions only the shareholders of the seller
would have appraisal rights.
29. See note 19 supra. The instant court, while cognizant of the intention of
the Committee on Corporation Law, refused to equate it with the intent of the legislature. Instant case at 437, 143 A.2d at 31.
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shareholders of both corporations, or to only one.80 Except in those relatively few cases in which compelling reasons for following the statutory
merger scheme are present,3 1 the corporation can unite, as in the instant
case, by means of a transaction which is in form a purchase and sale,
denominating as purchaser the corporation whose shareholders appear most
likely to dissent. By so doing, the justification for the statutory categorization is virtually abandoned and the dissenting shareholder denied protection
in the very transactions in which he is most likely to feel its need. A more
consistent application of the drastic change rationale is achieved by recognizing, as did the instant court, that the use of hybrid forms of corporate
amalgamation make it "no longer helpful to consider an individual transaction in the abstract and solely by reference to the various elements therein
determine whether it is a 'merger' or a 'sale' "; 82 the inquiry must instead
be into the essential nature of the transaction and its effect on the individual
shareholder.3 3 It is not precisely clear, however, whether the court defined
the term "merger," as used in the statute, to include the present transaction,
thus requiring the grant of appraisal, or whether it instead defined both
mergers and purchase/sales under the statute narrowly, leaving the question of appraisal in hybrid transactions like that of the instant case to be
decided by analogy to the statute. The danger of the former approach is
that by limiting the term "purchase" to those transactions in which there
is a "purchase of assets without more," a transaction may be considered a
merger, and appraisal granted, if but a single incident of merger is present.
Since such transactions may in total effect be more like the traditional
purchase, the validity of the statutory categorization would be weakened
in much the same way as would occur were the label approach adopted.
Although some language in the opinion seems to indicate this type of treatment, the fact that the transaction here in question possessed virtually all
the incidents of the traditional merger renders this interpretation of the
holding unnecessary.
Under either interpretation of the court's treatment, the decision can
be overturned, at least in part, by future statutory amendment.3 4 This
30. This applies where appraisal is given for a sale of corporate assets. See note
28 supra. In jurisdictions having no statutory appraisal right for a sale of assets,
the choice would necessarily become either granting appraisal to the shareholders of
both corporations or not granting it at all. Some jurisdictions provide for commonlaw appraisal rights, however, in the sale-of-assets transaction. See Note, 46 CALIF.
L. REv. 283 (1958), discussing the common-law appraisal remedy, with specific discussion of the Pennsylvania approach prior to the enactment of the statutory appraisal
right.
31. The difference between consummating a transaction according to the statutory merger section and doing so according to a contractual arrangement between the
parties seems to be primarily one of form.
32. Instant case at 432, 143 A.2d at 28.
33. Id. at 432-34, 143 A.2d at 28-30.
34. The Pennsylvania Committee on Corporation Law has not yet reached a
conclusion as to what, if anything, should be done in the way of additional legislation
in light of the instant case. See Letter From John Mulford, Chairman, Committee
on Corporation Law, Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n, to the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, Sept. 18, 1958, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.

UNIVERSITY OP PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

426

[Vol. 107

could be accomplished, for example, by expressly providing that for appraisal purposes no transaction is to be considered a merger unless the
formal requirements of the statute are met. The wisdom of such an amendment, however, is doubtful. The alternative approach of making the determination in accordance with the basic nature of the transaction necessitates
the sacrifice of some degree of certainty and increases the area in which the
presence of the appraisal right may operate to inhibit merger. So long
as the drastic change policy is viewed as justifying the retention of the
appraisal device in these transactions, however, this treatment of the present
statutory formula seems the proper one.

SELF-INCRIMINATION-PLAINTIFF'S
AGAINST SELF-INcR.IMIiNATION DURING
RESULTS IN DISMISSAL OF SuIT

USE

OF

PRIvmsGE

DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff sued as assignee of two judgments which he had obtained
only four days before the expiration of the twenty-year statute of limitations. In a court-ordered pre-trial discovery proceeding, defendant questioned plaintiff in an attempt to develop the affirmative defense that plaintiff had violated the New York Penal Law by obtaining a chose in action
for the purpose of bringing a suit upon it.' Invoking the privilege against
self-incrimination, 2 plaintiff refused to answer questions concerning the
circumstances under which the assignments were obtained. Although it
found that plaintiff was within his constitutional rights in claiming the
privilege, the court granted a defense motion 3 to strike the complaint and
dismiss the action. Levine v. Bornstein, 174 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct.

1958).
Although both the federal 4 and the typical state 5 guarantees against
compulsory self-incrimination are couched in terms of protecting the de1. N.Y. PENT. LAW § 274-75 make it a misdemeanor under certain circumstances
to "solicit, buy or take" a chose in action "for the purpose of bringing an action
thereon."
2. Plaintiff invoked both federal and state constitutional provisions. U.S. CONST.
amend. V; N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
3. Defendant's motion was based on N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 299, 405, as well as
on an appeal to the court's inherent power. The court found that neither § 299, which
penalizes a witness' failure to appear, nor § 405, which permits striking a pleading
where a person "fails without reasonable excuse to obey an order, duly served upon
him," were violated. Therefore, the dismissal was based upon the court's inherent
powers.

These powers "result from the very nature of [the court's] organization,

and are essential to its existence and protection, and to the due administration of
justice." Fuller v. State, 100 Miss. 811, 817, 57 So. 806, 807 (1911).
4. U.S. CONsT. amend. V: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal

case to be a witness against himself. .. ."
5. See, e.g., CAL. Co sT. art 1, § 13; MIcH. CONsT. art. II, § 6: "No person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
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fendant in a criminal case,6 this language generally has not been strictly
construed. 7 As a result, the privilege is available in civil as well as criminal cases 8 and to witnesses as well as the accused. 9 The privilege extends
to all testimony which would tend to subject the individual to fine, imprisonment, forfeiture or confiscation of land, or penalty., Nor has the privilege
been limited to matters arising during trial, but has been invoked legitimately at pre-trial examinations,:" grand jury hearings,12 and legislative
inquiries.' 3 Reported cases in which a plaintiff has invoked the protection
of this privilege are rare. In at least one previous case, a plaintiff's refusal
to answer questions by claiming the privilege against self-incrimination
resulted in dismissal.14 But, unlike the instant case, that case was a divorce
action, and the court applied equity principles and found that a plaintiff
who tries to prosecute while refusing to disclose relevant information does
not come to equity with requisite "clean hands." 15 Therefore, there appears to be little authority directly on point for or against the instant
court's determination that the plaintiff could properly invoke the privilege.
6. But see LA. CoiqsT. art. 1, § 11: "No person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself in a criminal case or in any proceeding that may subject him to
criminal prosecution . . ."; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 12: "No subject shall . . . be
compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself."
7. For a general discussion as to the scope and problems of the privilege see 8
See also Morgan, The Privilege
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2254-66 (3d ed. 1940).
Against Self-Ticriminatile, 34 MiNN. L. Rnv. 1, 23 (1949). However, in some jurisdictions the privilege may not be used to protect a witness from criminal prosecution
in another jurisdiction. State v. Thomas, 98 N.C. 599, 4 S.E. 518 (1887) ; State v.
Wood, 99 Vt. 490, 134 AtI. 697 (1926). But see, e.g., People ex rel. Morse v. Nussbaum, 55, App. Div. 245, 67 N.Y. Supp. 492 (1900). The privilege has not been
extended to protect a witness from disclosing facts leading to civil liability. In re
Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949). This is not to say that the privilege is not
available in civil suits. See note 8 infra.
8. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d
746, 749 (9th Cir. 1938) ; Chappel v. Chappel, 116 App. Div. 573, 101 N.Y. Supp. 846
(1906).
9. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) ; State v. Hamilton, 340 Mo.
768, 102 S.W.2d 642 (1937) ; Ingersol v. McWillie, 87 Tex. 647, 30 S.W. 869 (1895).
10. June Fabrics, Inc. v. Teri Sue Fashions, Inc., 194 Misc. 267, 81 N.Y.S.2d
877 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
11. Bradley v. O'Hare, 2 App. Div. 2d 436, 440, 156 N.Y.S2d 533, 538 (1956).
12. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) ; State v. Kemp, 126 Conn.
60, 72, 9 A.2d 63, 69 (1939) ; People v. Doe, 156 Misc. 304, 306, 280 N.Y. Supp. 508,
510 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1935).
13. See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955) ; United States v.
DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952) ; Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 177
N.E. 489 (1931).
14. Franklin v. Franklin, 365 Mo. 442. 283 S.W.2d 483 (1955).
15. In Frad v. Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 178 Misc. 705, 37 N.Y.S.2d 250
(N.Y.C. Munic. Ct. 1941), plaintiff was allowed to claim the privilege without incurring the penalty of dismissal when the question presented concerned defendant's
counterclaim. Since in a counterclaim the plaintiff stands in the position of a defendant, this may account for the decision differing from the instant case. See text
accompanying note 24 infra. In Silverman v. Silverman, 135 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct.
1954), aff'd mee., 285 App. Div. 811, 137 N.Y.S.2d 825, aff'd mewm., 309 N.Y. 906
(1955), plaintiff's right to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination during a
pre-trial examination was upheld, but the case was not reported further and therefore
it is not known whether defendant moved for dismissal.
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However, plaintiffs have been permitted to invoke other privileges by most
l6
courts that have faced the issue. Thus, the physician-patient privilege,
8
17
the attorney-client privilege, the marital privilege,' and the governmental
state secrets 19 and informer 20 privileges have been held to be available
to the plaintiff in a civil action. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
2
also expressly deny discovery of privileged matter. 1 After recognizing
that the plaintiff could properly invoke the privilege, the instant court went
on to grant defendant's motion to dismiss the action. In this regard the
determination would seem to be contrary to the approach taken by courts
which have permitted plaintiffs to invoke other privileges. In those cases
it would appear that the information sought by the defendant was just as
important to the establishment of an affirmative defense or the discrediting
of plaintiff's allegations as it was in the instant case. However, those courts
22
did not dismiss the action or impose any other sanction upon the plaintiff.
The effect of the instant court's determination to dismiss the action,
because of plaintiff's refusal to divulge the information sought by defend16. E.g., Woernley v. Electromatic Typewriters, Inc., 271 N.Y. 228, 2 N.E.2d
638 (1936) (in personal injury suit plaintiff was permitted to prevent defendant's
discovery of hospital reports showing plaintiff's physical condition prior to injuries).
But see Leusink v. O'Donnell, 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W.2d 675 (1949). Recognizing
defendant's interests in personal injury suits, Wisconsin passed a statute whereby
plaintiff could be denied the physician-patient privilege. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 269.57
(1957).
17. E.g., Chicago Great W.R.R. v. McCaffrey, 178 Iowa 1147, 160 N.W. 818
(1917) (client prevented defendant from obtaining his correspondence to counsel
which contained his admissions on the case) ; Montgomery v. Pickering, 116 Mass.
227 (1874) (although plaintiff used counsel as his witness on matters other than the
privileged communication, defendant was not permitted to question the attorney concerning-the communication).
18. E.g., Ward v. Dickson, 96 Iowa 708, 65 N.W. 997 (1896) (defendant was not
permitted to question husband in wife's suit on a promissory note) ; Lihs v. Lihs, 44
Neb. 143, 62 N.W. 457 (1895) (husband suing son for rescission of a deed was permitted to use the privilege to prevent his wife from testifying to circumstances surrounding the transfer of the deed).
19. E.g., United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944). See
also Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (Government as defendant).
20. E.g., Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951) ; United States
v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) : "IT]he deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant . . ."; FED. R. Civ. P. 34: "[Tlhe court . . .
may order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged. . . ." Of
course, in determining if material can be withheld under these rules the court might
well inquire whether the matter would be privileged at the trial. Therefore, the rules
do not necessarily recognize plaintiffs' right to invoke privileges. The corresponding
New York rules do not contain any specific limitation on the discovery of privileged
matter. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 288: "Any party to an action in a court of record
may cause to be taken by deposition, before trial, his own testimony or that of any
other party which is material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of the
action"; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 324: "A court . . . by order may compel a party
. . . to produce and discover, or to give to the other party, an inspection and copy,
or permissionn to take a copy or photograph of a book, document, or other paper, or
to make discovery of any article or property, in his possession or under his control,
relating to the merits of the action, or of the defense therein."
22. See cases cited notes 16-20 "pra.
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ant, is substantially to deny the privilege against self-incrimination to plaintiff. If the court had ruled that plaintiff could not invoke the privilege
he would have been faced with the choice of complying with an order to
answer the questions or of having his complaint dismissed for failure to
obey a court order.23 This is in fact the decision plaintiff was forced to
make in the instant case. Notwithstanding the weight of authority when
plaintiff has withheld information under a claim of other privileges, the
decision of the instant court to dismiss appears justified. The question is
not whether plaintiff should be forced to divulge the requested information
since the alternative course of withdrawing the action is always open.
Rather, the question is whether plaintiff should be permitted to withhold
information which might well relieve defendant of liability and at the same
time be permitted to prosecute his claim. The risk that plaintiff might
thereby succeed in an unmeritorious claim would seem to be so substantial
that plaintiff must either divulge the information or abandon his claim.
A court might well justify such a requirement by reference to the traditional
notions of waiver: a person should not be permitted to divulge only that part
of the story favorable to his position and thus present a distorted and misleading picture of what really happened.2 4 If the plaintiff is permitted to
present sufficient facts to establish a cause of action, the defendant should
not then be denied the right to uncover all relevant facts through discovery
and cross-examination of plaintiff in his attempt to avoid liability. On the
other hand, implicit in the use of dismissal as a sanction is the danger that
the information withheld under claim of privilege would not in fact relieve
defendant of liability were it disclosed, and that plaintiff might then be
denied recovery in some case merely because there were certain facts
which he did not wish to be made public. Therefore, as was done in the
instant case, the court should require that defendant make a clear showing
that the inquiry is designed to uncover facts which would in all probability
relieve him of liability.
The determination by the instant court that plaintiff was not barred
from invoking the self-incrimination privilege may have greater significance
23. See note 3 supra. The case of Bloch v. Guaranty Trust Co., 119 Misc. 832,
198 N.Y. Supp. 305 (Sup. Ct 1922), indicates that the court could not have imposed
the contempt sanction of § 405 of the New York Civil Practice Act on plaintiff for
refusal to divulge nonprivileged matter. If, however, plaintiff were forced to choose
between withdrawing and contempt, it would seem that he must choose the latter if he
wished to appeal the court's determination that there was no privilege.
24. E.g., Nolan v. Glynn, 163 Iowa 146, 142 N.W. 1029 (1913) (plaintiff testified
as to consulting physician and as to medicine given her and her operation; held,
waiver); Cantley v. American Sur. Co., 225 Mo. App. 1146, 38 S.W.2d 739 (1931)
(when plaintiff permitted wife to testify as to his communications with her he could
not prevent defense witness from testifying as to the communication). Generally,
courts have found that plaintiff's testifying in his own behalf is not waiver, unless
some detail of the privileged communication is revealed. E.g., Barker v. Kuhn, 38
Iowa 392 (1874) (plaintiff's testifying did not entitle defendant on cross-examination
to question plaintiff concerning statement he made to his lawyers); Fox v. Union
Turnpike Co., 59 App. Div. 363, 69 N.Y. Supp. 551 (1901) (physician-patient privilege
not waived when plaintiff in action to recover for personal injuries testified generally
as to her injuries but did not disclose any conversation with her physician or detail
anything done by him).
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in a future case where the information sought would not completely relieve
the defendant of liability but merely concerns a part of plaintiff's claim for
relief. For example, plaintiff sues for injuries sustained due to the negligence of defendant and alleges loss of wages as one of his counts of damages. If plaintiff's occupation is illegal, he might well be confronted with
a question by defendant during discovery or during the trial directed at
determining his line of work. If in this situation the courts were to say
that plaintiff cannot legitimately invoke the privilege, the choice, as it was
in the instant case, would be to answer the question or face dismissal of the
entire action for refusing to comply with a court order.
By recognizing

that plaintiff may properly invoke the privilege, the court, however, left
the way clear to tailor the sanction so as to adequately protect defendant,
yet not injure plaintiff more than necessary to achieve this end.26 In the
example above, foreclosure of the claim for loss of wages would be all that
is necessary to avoid prejudice to defendant. Further, the rationale behind
the waiver doctrine would seem to require no more.2 7 Since plaintiff's
occupation is not relevant to the determination of defendant's negligence or
to the amount of doctor and hospital bills plaintiff incurred, permitting
plaintiff to withhold information concerning his occupation would not result
in a distorted and misleading picture on these matters.
25. Plaintiff could not rely, in this situation, on an amendment to his complaint
withdrawing the allegation of lost wages since the granting of such amendments is
normally discretionary with the trial court. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 115 (2d ed.
1947).
26. The Supreme Court has recently indicated that dismissal for failure to answer
pre-trial depositions may well involve due process objections. Societe Internationale
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). Therefore, the Court indicated that trial courts
should use the sanction of dismissal sparingly.
27. It should be noted, however, that the waiver doctrine normally applied to
criminal defendants who choose to take the stand in their own behalf would indicate
a different result in this situation. In those cases the defendant is held to waive the
privilege against self-incrimination on all matters within the scope of cross-examination. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2276 (3d ed. 1940). By analogy, it might be said that
plaintiff, by bringing the action, has waived the privilege as to all matters which
defendant might seek to uncover concerning the claim, even though the matter concerned only one of several allegations of injury. It would seem that this situation
is readily distinguishable from that of the instant case since the criminal defendant
may choose not to take the stand while the civil plaintiff is subject to pre-trial interrogatories or to being called to the stand during trial at defendant's behest.

